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I. INTRODUCTION 
A significant, if not dominant, strain of contemporary legal theory posits the 
following ideal as a fundamental precondition of civic justice: given the nature of 
human persons and their pluralistic beliefs and practices, autonomous determination 
of choices about intimate conduct can be justly constrained by the state only when 
such constraint is imposed under the application of rational principles that all citizens 
could be reasonably expected to accept. This general epistemological standard for 
the foundation of civic freedom and, concomitantly, the condition for its restriction, 
has been explicated most familiarly under the notion of “public reason” as proposed 
by John Rawls and other legal theorists.1 
                                                                
1See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).  Rawls states:  
[P]olitical liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that . . . can gain the 
support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines in a society regulated by it.  Gaining this support of reasonable doctrines lays 
the basis for . . . how citizens, who remain deeply divided on religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines, can still maintain a just and stable democratic society.  To this 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss2/5
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Reflection upon constitutional substantive due process case law as it has 
developed over the last century suggests that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has not been indifferent to political philosophy. Culminating in two relatively recent 
decisions, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey2 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,3 the Court has demonstrated its awareness and seeming 
acceptance of the demand that any articulation of fundamental legal rights and any 
restriction upon such rights be justified by standards of rationality that all citizens 
could be expected to accept in principle. 
In the (in)famous Casey “mystery passage,”4 the Court observed that the nature 
of the human person demands that citizens be free to determine themselves in basic 
matters of liberty without coercion by the state.5 In Lawrence, elaborating 
specifically on the import of this passage, the Court explained that in view of this 
ideal the state may not permissibly impose constraints upon basic liberties based on 
either religious or moral grounds.  Such bases are not shared by citizens in common: 
“‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.’”6  
The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two 
classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” 
in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more 
reflective Supreme Court precedent.  The project of “public reason” claims to offer 
an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of 
incompatible options for the exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse 
community.  In fact, however, although logical commonalities might be available to 
pick out from the multitude of particularized accounts of what constitutes “civic 
order,” no “public reason” so derived could adequately capture—and thus be able to 
secure in a practical sense—any single determinate civic order, much less one that 
would be consistent with all citizens’ conceptions of public order.7 The demand that 
coercive limitations on autonomy be justified only by rational arguments that all 
citizens could in principle accept is founded upon a deficient philosophical 
understanding of practical reasoning (of which legal analysis is a subset) and 
supported by little, if any, historical precedent. 
Part I of this Article raises a number of issues for consideration relating to the 
epistemology of law and focuses especially on the concept of public reason and its 
critique. Part II addresses alternative approaches to legal reasoning suggested by 
                                                          
end, it is normally desirable that the comprehensive philosophical and moral views we 
are wont to use in debating fundamental political issues should give way in public life.  
Public reason—citizens’ reasoning in the public forum about constitutional essentials 
and basic questions of justice—is now best guided by a political conception the 
principles and values of which all citizens can endorse . . . . 
JOHN RAWLS, Fundamental Ideas, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra, at 3, § 1.4, at 3, 10 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Fundamental Ideas].  
2Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
3Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
4See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850; see also discussion infra Part I.B.5.a. 
5Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
6Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
7See infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text for an elaboration of this conclusion. 
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classical accounts of practical reasoning and virtue theory and considers the 
operation of such legal analysis outside the area of substantive due process; Part III 
analyzes post-Lawrence case law confirming the dilemma created by the Supreme 
Court’s ambiguous approaches to substantive due process and concludes that only 
one interpretation—that articulated fully in Washington v. Glucksberg and given lip 
service in Lawrence v. Texas—provides a method for resolving novel substantive 
due process challenges that is philosophically sound as well as historically coherent. 
Rather than perpetuating a fiction that denies the propriety of lawmaking unless 
based on principles that all citizens can rationally agree upon, an appropriate model 
of substantive due process analysis recognizes that law must inevitably be based 
upon principles that cannot be agreed upon by all citizens in virtue of rationality 
alone. 
II.  THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
In general, the minimal standard for review of all legal judgments, whether 
legislative or judicial, is that they not be “arbitrary and capricious” but rather 
supported by a reasonable basis in the eyes of the law.8 While the factual content of 
a reasonable basis varies from case to case,9 this general requirement demands that 
legal determinations be based on adequate sorts of “reasons.”   
Due process analysis, as in other legal contexts, protects against the imposition of 
arbitrary and capricious governmental conduct.10 Specifically, review of substantive 
due process challenges to a legal enactment involves the application of one of two 
standards, depending upon the general nature of the liberty interest at stake, as well 
as the interest of the state in enforcing that law.11 In default cases involving 
regulation of “garden variety” social or economic activity, a deferential “rational 
basis” standard is applied.12  In such cases, the enactment generally will be upheld 
                                                                
8See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 765 (1990).  In Jeffers, the Supreme Court states 
the following:  
[I]n determining whether a state court’s application of its constitutionally adequate 
aggravating circumstance was so erroneous as to raise an independent due process or 
Eight Amendment violation, we think the more appropriate standard of review is the 
“rational factfinder” standard established in Jackson v. Virginia  . . . where . . . federal 
courts must determine . . . “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).   
9See infra text accompanying notes 11-15 regarding the differing standards of reason 
required to impinge on otherwise constitutionally protected conduct.  
10
“The Supreme Court often declares that ‘arbitrary’ governmental action is 
constitutionally prohibited.  The most influential judicial opinion ever written about the 
meaning of substantive due process proclaimed that ‘the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause . . . includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints.’”  Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1037 (2006) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
11Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801 
(2006).   
12See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (refusing to 
overturn an Oklahoma statute permitting only licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists to 
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provided the law in question is “rationally related to a legitimate interest.”13 
However, in cases involving “fundamental” or “basic” liberty interests,14 the 
government must show that enforcement of the statute satisfies a “strict scrutiny” 
test, whereby the court must determine whether the enactment is narrowly tailored to 
serve a “compelling” state interest.15 In short, both tests aspire to assure that the 
government’s conduct is not “arbitrary and capricious,” mutatis mutandis, based on 
the nature of the value threatened by a particular law, the extent of the burden 
imposed upon that value, and the interest of the state in enforcing the law.16  The 
more fundamental a value is considered, the higher the standard of rationality must 
be in order to conclude that an interference with it is not “arbitrary and capricious.”  
The most problematic inquiry in matters of substantive due process centers 
around determining the appropriate rationales that should be brought to bear in 
defining the scope of “basic liberties” and “legitimate state interests.” Controversy 
concerning the content of such rights commonly reflects significant disagreement 
concerning the proper characterization of these interpretive factors. Unfortunately, 
no clear consensus exists as to the sorts of normative distinctions to be employed. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s comments on equal protection claims apply with similar 
force to substantive due process considerations: 
 
“What legitimate state interest does the classification promote?  What 
fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?”   
 
Surely there could be no better nor more succinct guide to sound 
legislation than that suggested by these two questions.  They are 
somewhat less useful, however, as guides to constitutional adjudication.  
How is this Court to determine whether or not a state interest is 
                                                          
fit lenses for eyeglasses); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (sustaining a Kansas law 
prohibiting anyone from engaging in the business of debt collecting except as an incident to 
the lawful practice of law). 
13See Staszewski, supra note 10, at 1038.  Staszewski states: 
The Court . . . reviews ordinary legislation under the rational basis test and examines 
whether a challenged provision is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.  [T]his test is extremely deferential to the legislature and effectively results in 
the invalidation of a challenged provision only when it lacks any conceivable public 
purpose or is entirely irrational. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
14See discussion infra Part III.A. 
15See generally, Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
16See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating that the purpose of the 
Due Process Clause was “‘to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government’” (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)); W. Coast Hotel Co. 
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (finding that to sustain state action, a court need only decide 
that it is not “arbitrary or capricious”); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 
(1926) (invalidating state action where it “‘passes the bounds of reason and assumes the 
character of a merely arbitrary fiat’” (quoting Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 
192, 204 (1912)); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 211 
(1989). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
162 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:157 
“legitimate”? And how is the Court to know when it is dealing with a 
“fundamental personal right”?  
 
. . . Nowhere in the text of the Constitution, or in its plain implications, 
is there any guide for determining what is a “legitimate” state interest, or 
what is a “fundamental personal right.”17 
A.  Religious Belief and Legitimate State Interests 
Although no specific criteria defining a theory of legitimate state interest may be 
dictated by the Constitution, a starting point for the delineation of this concept is 
possible, at the minimum, by a via negativa: that is, by consideration of the sorts of 
interests that generally have been excluded as an appropriate basis for enacting laws. 
There is little dispute that under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments direct 
reliance on specific religious beliefs is an impermissible basis for the enactment of a 
law.  
For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard,18 the Supreme Court rejected a Louisiana 
state law requiring the teaching of “creation science.”19  In the face of an 
Establishment Clause challenge, Louisiana argued that the purpose of the statute was 
“to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom.”20  In response, 
the Court noted that while it is “normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a 
secular purpose, [it requires] that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a 
sham.”21  Concluding that the actual purpose of the Louisiana legislature was to 
further religious interests,22 the Court held the statute unconstitutional.23  Of note in 
                                                                
17Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 181 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
18Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
19Id. at 596-97.  In fact, the statute required the teaching of creation science only if 
evolution was also taught.  Id. at 580.  Therefore, if evolution were not included in the 
curriculum, there was no requirement to teach creation science.  Id. 
20Id. at 581. 
21Id. at 586-87; see also McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005) 
(“[G]overnment action must have ‘a secular . . . purpose,’ and after a host of cases it is fair to 
add that although a legislature's stated reasons will generally get deference, the secular 
purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious 
objective.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612 (1971)). 
22Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592-93.  The Court stated: 
[I]t is not happenstance that the legislature required the teaching of a theory that 
coincided with this religious view.  The legislative history documents that the Act’s 
primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools in order to 
provide persuasive advantage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual 
basis of evolution in its entirety. . . .  The legislation therefore sought to alter the 
science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the 
theory of evolution.  
Id. 
23Id. at 593 (“Because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a 
particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment.”). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss2/5
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Edwards, both the state and the Supreme Court agreed that a valid law could not be 
motivated by a desire to advance religious belief as such, but rather must be 
grounded in a “secular purpose.”24 
The same rationale prevents the government from imposing restrictive laws 
motivated primarily based on animus against a religious belief rather than enforcing 
a legitimate interest.25  In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the 
Court struck down, under the Free Exercise Clause, a purportedly “neutral” city 
ordinance against animal cruelty.26 The Court cited the record and legislative history 
in finding that the regulation was in fact motivated primarily by opposition to the 
ritual sacrifice practiced by members of a local religious group.27 It rejected the 
conclusion that the prohibition was supported by an adequate governmental 
interest.28 
Due to the far reaching breadth of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 
holdings directly focusing on the impermissibility of government’s adoption or 
rejection of a religious belief as grounds for resolving a substantive due process or 
equal protection claim are rare.29  Discussion, however, of the role of religious belief 
in substantive due process cases is not lacking. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, (a pivotal case in virtue of its eventual reversal in 
Lawrence v. Texas), Justice Blackman noted in his dissent that the petitioners’ 
reliance on the legal argument that sodomy violated traditional religious beliefs 
undermined their argument:  
The assertion that “traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe” the 
conduct involved cannot provide an adequate justification for § 16-6-2.  
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior 
at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the entire 
citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on 
whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its 
conformity to religious doctrine. Thus, far from buttressing his case, 
petitioner’s invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
                                                                
24
 Id. at 582. 
25See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(requiring government to show that law was motivated by “compelling state interest” because 
law not neutral). 
26Id. at 520. 
27Id. at 534-38. 
28Id. at 533.  The Court stated: 
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of 
a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the 
law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is 
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
29
“The Court’s attempted devaluation of the free exercise clause to challenge religious 
discrimination, at least in cases not presenting outrageous facts of religious intolerance, may 
signal the need to focus on the equality principle of the equal protection clause as an additional 
source to protect religious liberty.”  Religion, in JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 5:21 (2006). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
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sodomy’s heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines his 
suggestion that § 16-6-2 represents a legitimate use of secular coercive 
power.  A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious 
intolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.  
“The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it 
tolerate them.  Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the 
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”30 
Of course, in ruling to uphold the statute that criminalized sodomy, the majority 
in Bowers had not relied on the petitioners’ argument based on religious grounds.31  
Instead, they cited the validity of general morals legislation among those 
considerations that justified the statute.  Rejecting the respondents’ argument that the 
moral grounds in question were inadequate, Justice White observed:  “The law, 
however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing 
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the 
courts will be very busy indeed.”32 
Prior to Lawrence,33 the basic distinction between Blackmun’s impermissible 
religious basis and the majority’s permissible morals basis appears to have been 
generally accepted. As reflected in Supreme Court opinions and opinions of 
numerous other courts, a legislative object can often function as the object of both 
religious and secular reasoning.  While laws based on general moral or ethical norms 
might be historically related to, and overlap with, religious convictions, such 
association does not undermine the secular nature and constitutionality of such laws:  
[T]he “Establishment” Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of 
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize 
with the tenets of some or all religions.  In many instances, the Congress 
or state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly 
apart from any religious considerations, demands such regulation.  Thus, 
for temporal purposes, murder is illegal.  And the fact that this agrees with 
the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions while it may disagree with 
others does not invalidate the regulation.  So too with the questions of 
                                                                
30See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1986) (citation and footnote omitted) 
(quoting Brief of Petitioner at 20, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 
667939, and Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  In Webster, Justice Stevens stated: 
There is unquestionably a theological basis for such an argument, just as there was 
unquestionably a theological basis for the Connecticut statute that the Court 
invalidated in Griswold. Our jurisprudence, however, has consistently required a 
secular basis for valid legislation.  Because I am not aware of any secular basis for 
differentiating between contraceptive procedures that are effective immediately before 
and those that are effective immediately after fertilization, I believe it inescapably 
follows that the preamble to the Missouri statute is invalid under Griswold and its 
progeny.   
Id. at 565-66 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
31Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. 
32Id. 
33See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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adultery and polygamy.  The same could be said of theft, fraud, etc., 
because those offenses were also proscribed in the Decalogue.34  
In short, the demand for a secular rationale to justify governmental conduct is 
relatively uncontroversial as a matter of established Supreme Court precedent.  
While the question of what constitutes a “religious belief” as opposed to a “moral 
belief” is inevitably implicated by the statements in Bowers and other cases (as will 
be discussed below), the potential overlap between religious convictions and secular 
rationales, at least traditionally, was not thought to entail a collapsing of the concepts 
into one another.  Rather, the distinction was essential in attempting to protect 
religious freedom while at the same time affirming laws of secular import whose 
content has been traditionally associated with religious beliefs.35 
B.  Liberal Democracy and Epistemological Restraint 
The preceding discussion illustrating how specific religious beliefs are excluded 
from the otherwise broad set of interests that may be asserted as legitimate state 
interests parallels discussions in political theory concerning how the religious beliefs 
of citizens—whether individual voters, judges or legislators36—ought to inform their 
political conduct. This normative discussion is especially relevant in substantive due 
process contexts, that is, when religious reasons might be offered as a rationale for 
legal determinations having a coercive effect over conduct normally associated with 
matters of personal conscience, religion or privacy.  One scholar has formulated this 
purported epistemological restraint in the following manner: “a good citizen of a 
liberal democracy will refrain from allowing religious reasons to be determinative 
when deciding and/or debating political issues . . . unless, perchance, those religious 
reasons are themselves held for reasons of the acceptable sort.”37 
1.  Secular Rationales and Liberalism 
In defending such a restraint, Robert Audi argues that liberal democracies such as 
the United States are founded upon the supposition that coercive laws should be 
                                                                
34See McGowan v. Maryland., 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (citation omitted); see also 
Horace Mann League v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 220 A.2d 51, 61 (Md. 1966).  In Horace Mann 
League, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reiterated as follows: 
     “As McGowan makes clear, even though the exemption had an unmistakably 
religious origin, if the present purpose and effect of the exemption is primarily secular, 
and if those secular purposes could not reasonably be deemed achievable without an 
incidental benefit to religious organizations, the ‘establishment’ clause is not 
violated.”   
     The above rationale is supported and emphasized by so many statements in the 
Supreme Court's decisions that one is at a loss to know where to start and where to end 
in naming them. 
Id. at 61 & n.14 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Murray v. Comptroller of 
Treasury, 216 A.2d 897, 907 (Md. 1966)). 
35See discussion infra Part I.B.4 on the meaning of religion.  
36In ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE 
PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 7 (1997), neither author argues that 
such a position is required for public participation, but only for what is virtuous.   
37Id. at 69. 
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based on citizens’ “secular” reasons and motivations.38 Audi’s justification for this 
restriction flows from the nature of liberal democracy itself: “A liberal state exists in 
good part to accommodate a variety of people irrespective of their special preference 
for one kind of life over another.”39 Thus, because one constitutive rationale of 
liberal democracy is to enable an appropriate autonomy, coercion of any sort ought 
to be limited to situations when there are considerations “that any rational adult 
citizen will find persuasive and can identify with.”40  Further, such coercion must be 
justified by reasons showing that the coercive laws are strictly necessary for “civic 
order,” and not instituted merely on the basis of “majority preference.”41  
Based on this limitation, Audi argues that religious beliefs, insofar as they are not 
shared by all rational members of society, cannot be justified as a basis for imposing 
coercive laws.42 Although Audi allows that actors may have religious reasons and 
motivations that are effective in moving citizens to act, in order to exercise 
democratic civic virtue, the actor must also have secular reasons for such conduct 
and be able to affirm that such secular reasons would be sufficient to motivate that 
conduct absent religious considerations.43 The dictates of democratic virtue require 
that only those religious motivations capable of finding a self-supporting secular 
analogue form a proper basis for public discourse.44 All other motivations will 
invariably betray the value of individual freedom that lies at the foundation of liberal 
democracy. Ultimately, an actor can claim to exercise civic virtue only when the 
non-religious justifications that he offers are capable of standing alone. 
2.  Deconstructing Liberal Epistemology 
In disagreement with Audi’s position, Nicholas Wolterstorff challenges the view 
that one’s virtuous participation in liberal democracy entails the religious-reason 
constraint. Wolterstorff’s strongest argument flows from his critique of the 
epistemology underlying liberalism. He notes that the function of the religious-
reason constraint is essentially negative, that is, it states what cannot count as a 
reason: 
[C]itizens (and officials) are not to base their decisions and/or debates 
concerning political issues on their religious convictions. . . . They are to 
base their political decisions and their political debate in the public space 
                                                                
38Id. at 16-17. 
39Id. at 16.   
40Id.  Audi also states:  
 A liberal democracy by its very nature resists using coercion, and prefers 
persuasion, as a means to achieve cooperation. . . .  A liberal state exists in good part 
to accommodate a variety of people irrespective of their special preference for one 
kind of life over another; it thus allows coercion only where necessary to preserve 
civic order and not simply on the basis of majority preference.    
Id. at 16-17. 
41Id. at 17. 
42Id. at 16. 
43Id. at 23. 
44Id. 
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on the principles yielded by some source independent of any and all of the 
religious perspectives to be found in society.45 
In its positive description, however, Wolterstorff observes that different versions 
of liberalism offer diverging accounts of what can permissibly serve as a valid 
independent source, varying from concepts of “publicly accessible reasons,” to 
“secular reasons” to “reasons derived from the shared political culture.”46 
According to Wolterstorff, the only thing that these secular theories hold in 
common is their steadfast refusal to concede legitimacy to religious beliefs in 
enacting civil law.47 Noting the mutually exclusive presuppositions of these 
positions, Wolterstorff proposes that in the absence of an independent source shared 
by all rational participants, the only reasonable conclusion a person could have is 
that the common sharing of a single independent source is impossible:  
No matter what principles of justice a particular political theorist may 
propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible 
understanding whatsoever of ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all 
reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather 
that not all of them would do so.48  
In view of the diversity of rational justifications constituting liberalism, each 
proposing its own notion of an “independent source,” Wolterstorff rejects 
liberalism’s singling out of “religious reasons” for exclusion.  He concludes from 
that lack of agreement, that the very project of liberalism “is unacceptable in all its 
versions.  It is unacceptable not because none of the extant versions happens to get 
all the details right, but unacceptable because no rationale offered for the restraint is 
cogent, and no independent source meets the demands.”49 
In view of this inherent epistemological weakness, Wolterstorff concludes that 
the appropriate response of liberal democracy—one more in keeping with a 
commitment to let persons live as they see fit—would be to remove all 
epistemological restraints on political decision-making as long as the conduct in 
question does not violate the restraint against direct religious content.50  In short, 
                                                                
45Id. at 73. 
46Id. at 74.  Wolterstorff asserts that some versions of liberalism exclude as a proper basis 
for decision-making even conclusions flowing from “non-religious comprehensive 
perspectives” that do not comport with one of these alleged shared bases.  Id. 
47Id. at 75 (“What unites this buzzing variety of positions into one family of liberal 
positions is that they all propose a restraint on the use of religious reasons in deciding and/or 
debating political issues.”).  
48Id. at 99.  Examining, in detail, John Locke’s and John Rawls’ accounts of the 
“independent source,” Wolterstorff argues that both positions ultimately fail to offer any 
ground that can be shared by all rational participants: “[T]he contested fate of Rawls’s own 
proposed principles of justice is illustrative.  What is reasonable . . . to expect is that . . . 
proposals will stir up controversy and dissent not only at the point of transition from the 
academy to general society, but within the academy.”  Id.  
49Id. at 81. 
50Here, Wolterstorff must have in mind something like a neutral, generally applicable law, 
such as that considered in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Such a position, 
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because of liberalism’s failure to provide an account of an independent basis 
justifying secular beliefs, Wolterstorff argues that no reason exists to isolate religious 
belief as an impermissible basis for enacting laws.51 
3.  Secular versus Religious Rationales:  A Distinction without a Difference? 
Wolterstorff’s critique of the restraining condition of secular reasoning, while 
certainly raising legitimate concerns, is not lacking difficulties of its own. As 
illustrated above in the discussion of the limits of legitimate state interests, federal 
constitutional law differentiates between secular and religious rationales for legal 
enactments.  Legislation adopted on the basis of a specific religious belief as such, or 
adopted primarily because of a religious motivation, is impermissible.52  While this 
argument, standing alone, does not theoretically justify the exclusion of religious 
rationales, it does suggest that Wolterstorff’s reductio ad absurdum may not be as 
effective as he believes.  Although such exclusion may ultimately prove rationally 
incoherent, the practice presents a prima facie legitimacy that suggests some possible 
justification. 
Additionally, Wolterstorff’s argument appears to fall under the weight of its own 
epistemological skepticism, that is to say that his argument proves too much. By 
maintaining that all positions are equally foundationless, the position undermines its 
own claim to rational justification. In Wolterstorff’s view, no reason exists to believe 
that citizens have a shared rational ground for agreement upon rational principles. 
Thus, no common basis exists for corporately distinguishing what counts as a 
“reasonable” basis from what counts as an “arbitrary and capricious” basis. If so, 
upon what common ground does Wolterstorff propose his own argument favoring 
elimination of the distinction between religious and secular rationales? If differences 
cannot be resolved by appeal to some shared rational foundations, this undercuts, if 
not completely negates, the value of his attempt to present a reasoned argument 
favoring his position and justifying the rejection of the liberal restraint. One has the 
distinct impression that he seems to be saying more than just “follow me.”53 
                                                          
according to Wolterstorff’s view, would be more in keeping with the notion of liberal 
democracy than imposition of the religious-reason restraint.  See AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, 
supra note 36, at 77.  Wolterstorff asserts:    
[T]here is something profoundly paradoxical about the suggestion that the role of 
citizen in a liberal democracy includes this restraint. . . .  Using their religious 
convictions in making their decisions and conducting their debates on political issues 
is part of what constitutes conducting their lives as they see fit. . . .  The liberal 
position—restraint on religious reasons—appears to be in flagrant conflict with the 
Idea of liberal democracy. 
Id.  For a similar argument, see Richard W. Garnett, Essay, Christian Witness, Moral 
Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 553 
(2003). 
51AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 36, at 99. 
52See discussion supra Part I.A.   
53Wolterstorff elsewhere encapsulates this epistemological skepticism by stating: 
“Confronted as we are with the fact that we lack a shared foundation, each of us has no choice 
but ‘to one’s own self be true.’”  NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, REASON WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF 
RELIGION 66 (2d ed. 1984) (1976). 
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4.  Religious Beliefs and Reasons 
Further, even if one accepts Wolterstorff’s conclusion that no set of rationales 
exists that all citizens can agree upon in principle, it does not follow that all 
rationales are thereby rendered equally (il)legitimate bases for lawmaking. In fact, 
there may be other relevant distinctions between secular rationales and religious 
bases that justify the exclusion of one type of reasoning over another, even if none 
can claim universal acceptability or accessibility. 
Wolterstorff’s own prohibition against direct incorporation of religious content 
into law indicates that he strongly distinguishes between religious beliefs and secular 
beliefs, even if implicitly. Although both religious beliefs and motivations may be 
utilized in full force when making decisions about lawmaking, he apparently does 
not believe that this eliminates all epistemological restraints on the content of the law 
that can be enacted. “[W]hy should epistemological restraints be laid on a person 
when the legislation advocated by that person does not violate the restraints on 
content?”54 
Wolterstorff’s argument, however, had been offered to demonstrate that 
“religious reasons” have no less warrant or justification than “secular” reasons in 
political thinking.  If this were true, why should the “content” of religious beliefs 
continue to be excluded from direct legislation? Wolterstorff’s willingness to 
exclude religious content from public law belies his parallel efforts to assert that 
religious reasons and secular reasons are equally legitimate bases for lawmaking. 
Insistence upon this epistemological restraint reveals that Wolterstorff, too, accepts 
some relevant difference between religious beliefs and secular beliefs that makes the 
former an inappropriate object for direct legislation. 
For obvious reasons, no individual study could adequately account for the 
breadth and variety of views that address the epistemological status of religious 
beliefs, especially as such views manifest themselves in theological, philosophical, 
and legal contexts that are virtually limitless. Supreme Court definitions of 
“religion,” for example, have been extended over time to apply broadly to any “given 
belief that is sincere and meaningful and occupies a place in the life of its possessor 
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”55  Expansion of the definition of 
religious beliefs sometimes is a two-edged sword, at once broadening protection for 
those beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause, while at the same time jeopardizing the 
right to employ such “religious” reasoning in lawmaking under the Establishment 
Clause. 
The following discussion will consider the propriety of the restraint on religious 
reasons based on what is arguably the most characteristic, if not unproblematic, 
notion of religious belief:  the notion of assenting to some truth (of propositional, 
                                                                
54AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 36, at 77. 
55United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).  As one scholar summarizes the 
Court’s modern conception of the beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment:  
With the near infinite malleability of the content of what is “moral” or based on a 
“policy,” the Court expanded the definition of religion to its farthest reach, 
encompassing all belief systems that are strongly held with only three ill-defined 
exceptions for beliefs that are pragmatic, expedient or based on policy.  
Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181, 203 
(2002). 
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factual, or other type)56 based on its having been revealed by God, or in more 
common terms, as accepted by “faith.”57 
In broad strokes, at least in the mainstream of Western tradition, the concept of 
religious belief refers to a mode of cognitional acquisition and assent defined in 
contradistinction to “natural knowledge.” In matters held by faith, as opposed to 
matters attained by natural reason, the justification for affirming a religious concept 
or doctrinal belief is not one’s own subjective insight or direct perception of the truth 
of the matter, but rather a conviction that the matter is so because God has revealed it 
to be so.58  Although some of these particular matters revealed by God may also be 
known by human reason, faith and reason cannot be regarded as identical in nature or 
mode. In keeping with this traditional account, holding a particular belief as a matter 
                                                                
56See generally THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 607 (Robert Audi ed., 1995) 
(“To be sure, such traditions typically affirm that faith goes beyond mere doctrinal belief to 
include an attitude of profound trust in God.  On most accounts, however, faith involves 
doctrinal belief, and so there is a contrast within the religious domain itself between faith and 
reason.”).  
57Of course, even this concept, in its specific explication, finds diverse meanings among 
various religious groups and even within sub-groups of a single religion. 
58See 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-II, q. 4, art. 1, at 1190 (Fathers of 
the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947) (1265-73).  St. Thomas 
Aquinas states: 
 The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the 
object of faith, is indicated by the words, evidence of things that appear not, where 
evidence is taken for the result of evidence.  For evidence induces the intellect to 
adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth 
of faith is called evidence here.  Hence another reading has conviction, because, to wit, 
the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it 
sees not.  Accordingly if anyone would reduce the [Apostle’s description] to the form 
of a definition, he may say that faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is 
begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.  
Id. 
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of faith and knowing it by natural knowledge are mutually exclusive.59 Vision or 
“understanding” of a truth excludes having “faith” in it.60 
                                                                
59See 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON TRUTH q. 14, art. 9, at 250 (James 
V. McGlynn trans., 1953) (1256-59), available at http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/ 
CDtexts/QDdeVer14.htm.  St. Thomas explains: 
[A] thing can be the object of belief in two ways.  In one it is such absolutely, that is, it 
exceeds the intellectual capacity of all men who exist in this life, for instance, that 
there is trinity and unity in God, and so on.  Now, it is impossible for any man to have 
scientific knowledge of these.  Rather, every believer assents to such doctrines 
because of the testimony of God to whom these things are present and by whom they 
are known. 
 A thing is, however, an object of belief not absolutely, but in some respect, when it 
does not exceed the capacity of all men, but only of some men.  In this class are those 
things which we can know about God by means of a demonstration, as that God exists, 
or is one, or has no body, and so forth.  There is nothing to prevent those who have 
scientific proofs of these things from knowing them scientifically, and others who do 
not understand the proofs from believing them.  But it is impossible for the same 
person to know and believe them. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
60This general account is clearly reflected in John Paul II, Fides Et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_ 
enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.html (encyclical letter to the bishops of the Catholic Church 
on the relationship between faith and reason):  
The First Vatican Council teaches, then, that the truth attained by philosophy and the 
truth of Revelation are neither identical nor mutually exclusive: “There exists a 
twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only as regards their source, but also as 
regards their object.  With regard to the source, because we know in one by natural 
reason, in the other by divine faith.  With regard to the object, because besides those 
things which natural reason can attain, there are proposed for our belief mysteries 
hidden in God which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known.”  Based 
upon God's testimony and enjoying the supernatural assistance of grace, faith is of an 
order other than philosophical knowledge which depends upon sense perception and 
experience and which advances by the light of the intellect alone.  Philosophy and the 
sciences function within the order of natural reason; while faith, enlightened and 
guided by the Spirit, recognizes in the message of salvation the “full[ness] of grace 
and truth” which God has willed to reveal in history and definitively through his Son, 
Jesus Christ.  
Id. at 9 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CATHOLIC 
FAITH DEI FILIUS IV (1870), and John 1:14).  
      Given this clear contrast between the nature of faith and reason, reflecting at least one 
dominant historical approach, efforts to solve the political question of the role of religious 
beliefs simply by dismissing the controversy seem unfruitful.  See, e.g., Michael W. 
McConnell, Leary Lecture, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments 
Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639 (1999).  
McConnell states:  
 The distinction between accessible arguments and arguments based on religion 
rests on a controversial view of epistemology that has been sharply disputed by some 
theorists.  These theorists contend that religious beliefs rest on the same sorts of 
experience, and can be evaluated according to the same criteria of evidence, as any 
other beliefs—or, conversely, that seemingly objective forms of knowledge, like 
science, rest ultimately on the same sort of faith claims that undergird religious beliefs. 
Id. at 651-52 (footnote omitted). 
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Such a view is supported by Brian Leiter in the context of questioning what, if 
any, principled argument may exist for governmental toleration of religion qua 
religion.  In developing his thought, Leiter argues that tolerance historically extended 
to religious belief has not been granted as a result of principled epistemic grounds 
that recognize religion as worthy of toleration.61  Drawing upon the work of 
Canadian legal philosopher Timothy Macklem, Leiter instead identifies as one of the 
properties of religious beliefs the fact that they, unlike other rationales, “do not 
answer to evidence and reasons.”62  Religious beliefs are “based on faith,” and “are 
insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification, the ones we 
employ in both common-sense and in science.”63 
                                                          
      Carrying this misunderstanding further, McConnell suggests that evidence of the lack of a 
distinction between religious belief and natural knowledge is reflected in examples of the 
Catholic Church’s appeal to the natural law in its political teachings and in misguided denials 
of the universal accessibility of biblical propositions: 
The Roman Catholic tradition, for example, typically participates in public debate on 
the basis of some version of natural law, which is perceived through the application of 
reason to nature.  There is nothing inaccessible about that.  The fundamentalist 
tradition typically presents arguments based on the Holy Bible, rejecting arguments 
based on emotion, tradition, or extrabiblical revelation to religious authorities.  It is 
difficult to imagine a more accessible view.  To be sure, not everyone agrees with the 
Bible, just as not everyone believes in Keynesian economics.  But the Bible is 
available to everyone.  All you have to do is pick it up and read.  The argument for 
exclusion of inaccessible justifications does not take us very far toward an argument 
for exclusion of religious justifications if it does not apply to Roman Catholicism or 
fundamentalism—the two religious views most secular liberals are most concerned 
about. 
Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).   
      McConnell’s argument here, however, appears to be founded upon two serious 
misconceptions.  First, the entire point of the “natural” law being based on “natural” reason is 
to signify precisely that it is not derived from “religious justifications” though it may be 
consistent with them.  See infra note 63 and accompanying text.  Second, objections to the 
enactment of laws based on the Bible do not depend, as McConnell seems to suggest, upon the 
assumption that its written propositions are inaccessible.  See infra note 69 and 70.  Rather, 
such objections are based on the fact that the truth of those propositions as religious truths is 
accessible only to those who accept them on the basis of divine inspiration, and not unaided 
reason.  That is what is not accessible to those without faith.  Rather than supporting 
McConnell’s conclusion that there is no relevant distinction between religious and non-
religious foundations, these examples actually confirm the propriety of that distinction. 
61Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion 1 (University of Texas Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 100, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=904640.  
62Id. at 17. 
63Id. at 15-16 (citing Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular Value, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1, 33 
(2000)).  Macklem asserts: 
 At its most basic level, the concept of faith describes the manner in which a 
particular belief or set of beliefs may be subscribed to by human beings.  In that sense 
of the word, faith exists as a type of rival to reason.  When we say that we believe in 
something as a matter of faith, . . . we express a commitment to that which cannot be 
established by reason . . . .  
Id.  Leiter reiterates: 
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Thus, even though matters of faith may reference specific cognitive content, as 
matters held by faith they are not to be understood as assented to as a result of 
natural reasoning processes.  The “truth” of such content is not warranted by appeal 
to the type of direct or inferential bases generally accessible and familiar to human 
knowers employing “unaided” natural reason. Implicit in this is the view that 
“evidence” sufficient for natural knowledge is constituted precisely because an 
object is grasped by the human mind in a way that either directly or indirectly carries 
its own warrant.  Faith propositions are assented to precisely on the ground that their 
truth has been revealed, i.e., has been vouched for by God.   
The “acceptance,” however, of certain truths as divinely revealed and thus 
reliable and trustworthy of belief can, in turn, itself not be considered a product of 
simple natural reasoning.  Because the scope of human natural knowledge is not 
identical with the scope of divine knowledge, knowing things as divinely revealed is 
not an inherently natural consequence of human knowing. The very concept of faith 
as a conviction about revealed truths, intrinsically involves appeal to a religious 
truth, that is, something not attainable by natural reason on its own. Generally, faith 
in this respect is held to be a “gift” and involves the operation of supernatural 
“grace.”64  
In sum, any affirmative view concerning the character, accessibility, or 
legitimacy of “faith” as a mode of “knowing” presupposes, at least on the traditional 
account, the assent of the human mind to cognitive beliefs that are not the result of a 
                                                          
Religious beliefs do not answer to evidence and reasons, as evidence and reasons are 
understood in other domains concerned with knowledge of the world.  Religious 
beliefs, in virtue of being based on “faith,” are insulated from ordinary standards of 
evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common-sense and in 
science.  
Id. at 17. 
      Although traditional religious accounts might quibble that Macklem’s and Leiter’s 
statements could be taken to exclude the possibility of grasping truths by reason that can also 
be matters of faith, they would agree that such matters cannot be established by reason and 
still be matters of faith, or vice versa.  Thus, Leiter’s and Macklem’s view generally captures 
the notion of faith as it has theologically been understood by major religious traditions.  See 
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text; see infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
64See Faith, in New Advent, The Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org/ 
cathen/05752c.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  The encyclopedia states: 
For Divine faith is supernatural both in the principle which elicits the acts and in the 
objects or truths upon which it falls.  The principle which elicits assent to a truth 
which is beyond the grasp of the human mind must be that same mind illumined by a 
light superior to the light of reason, viz. the light of faith, and since, even with this 
light of faith, the intellect remains human, and the truth to be believed remains still 
obscure, the final assent of the intellect must come from the will assisted by Divine 
grace, as seen above.  But both this Divine light and this Divine grace are pure gifts of 
God, and are consequently only bestowed at His good pleasure. 
Id.  As Wolterstorff observes:  
Not only is it not the case that one must hold one’s religious beliefs for reasons of the 
Lockean sort to be entitled to them, it is not, in general, necessary that one hold them 
for any reasons at all.  Something about the belief, the person, and the situation brings 
it about that the person is entitled to the belief.  But that need not be another belief 
whose propositional content functions as reason for the religious belief.   
AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 36, at 87.  
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“natural” mode of the mind’s operation.65 Rather, positive claims about the 
possibility of faith-knowledge must, for their own justification, inevitably depend 
upon the positing of a super-natural mode of cognition.66  Although diverse religious 
groups sharing a general concept of this traditional conception of faith may dispute 
just how such revelation is communicated and the specific conditions required for its 
acceptance,67 it seems undeniable that the affirmation of “faith” as a possible, valid 
form of knowledge constitutes itself an intrinsically religious belief, inaccessible to 
natural reason standing alone. 
Wolterstorff’s acceptance of the religious-content restraint on laws in the end 
appears to corroborate this fundamental distinction between faith and reason and 
therefore supports the reasonableness of legal constraints against lawmaking based 
directly on religious beliefs.  In response to Wolterstorff’s skeptical questioning of 
the purported difference between secular and religious rationales that renders the 
former a legitimate basis for lawmaking but not the latter, the following response is 
possible: secular rationales depend upon natural reason and are thereby at least 
remotely, if not proximately, accessible to every human person capable of exercising 
natural reason. Religious beliefs, however, at least on traditional understandings, 
both in respect to their content and the conditions required for assent to that content, 
are not accessible to natural reasoning operating on its own either proximately or 
remotely.68  
                                                                
65Again, this view does not deny that sometimes rational arguments can be forwarded 
against attempts to disprove matters of faith.  Further, probable arguments about the truth of 
many matters of faith may be available.  Matters of faith may be related from a variety of 
reasonable points of view in important and challenging ways with many acute problems of 
human existence.  
66Whether religious beliefs are themselves rational admits to much variation among 
religious groups.  While some distinguish between beliefs that could also be understood 
naturally (e.g., prohibitions against murder, rape, etc.) and those that could not (e.g., trinity, 
incarnation etc.), others maintain differing positions.  See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 56, at 607 (“Theists disagree about how such exclusive objects of 
faith are related to reason.  One prominent view is that, although they go beyond reason, they 
are in harmony with it; another is that they are contrary to reason.”). 
67Id.  (“Theists disagree about how such divine disclosures occur; the main candidates for 
vehicles of revelation include religious experience, the teachings of an inspired religious 
leader, the sacred scriptures of a religious community, and the traditions of a particular 
Church.”).   
      
68Recognition of this distinction is, for example, expressly reflected in Christopher 
Eberle’s concession that knowledge by faith arises from a type of cognitive experience distinct 
from the experiential basis of non-faith-based understanding.  See CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 239-46 (2002).  While all human persons, in 
virtue of being just such, share a “standard package” of cognitive abilities (sense perception, 
memory, introspection, inductive and deductive inference), faith as a special mode of knowing 
depends upon a distinct form of perception, and whose validity and reliability depends upon 
that perception.  Id. 
      From these premises, Eberle correctly observes that participants in the standard package 
have no justified basis for dismissing as unreliable modes of knowing dependent upon 
doxastic practices that fall outside the standard package.  Id.  Judgments concerning the 
reliability of any particular doxastic practice inevitably entail self-referential reliance upon 
those same internal practices.  Hence, while internal criteria may be employed in evaluating 
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To illustrate the point more clearly, it is useful to consider one possible response 
a religious adherent might propose in support of the contention that religious beliefs 
are as equally accessible as any attainable by natural reason.  The proponent might 
refer specifically to a belief that God offers, at all times and to all persons, the 
possibility of faith.  Thus, any appeal to a purported greater accessibility of natural 
reason over revealed truth would allegedly be groundless.  Although they are distinct 
forms of knowing, both would be equally accessible, and no reason exists to exclude 
one or the other as a permissible basis for lawmaking.  
                                                          
the reliability of a doxastic practice, it is inappropriate positively to dismiss one particular 
practice, e.g., knowledge by faith, as unreliable simply on the basis that it does not conform to 
the practices of another, distinct mode of knowledge, i.e., the standard package.  Judgments 
about other doxastic practices are simply outside the expertise conferred by the standard 
package. 
Based on this correct insight, however, Eberle erroneously concludes that he has 
established an argument for the legitimacy of religious belief as a basis for coercive political 
decision making:   
Mystical perception is thoroughly democratic in the relevant sense: just as any citizen 
enjoys cognitive capacities he could have employed to understand and evaluate . . . 
scientific theories that bear on specific coercive laws even though he can’t in fact, any 
citizen can perceive God in that he enjoys cognitive capacities that he can employ to 
perceive God even though he does not in fact. 
Id. at 260.  
      This line of argument, in fact, confirms a conclusion opposite to that which Eberle draws.  
The valid distinction drawn between doxastic practices constituting the “standard package” 
and those underlying religious belief confirms the propriety of distinguishing the role proper 
to purely religious beliefs from the “natural” knowledge attained by the standard package that 
all humans come equipped with.  On the basis of this distinction, it is entirely reasonable to 
conclude that religious beliefs formed as such should be excluded from direct political 
efficacy.  This is so, not because religious beliefs should be rejected as intrinsically irrational, 
suspect, or false.  Instead, they provide an inappropriate basis for direct imposition of coercive 
laws on non-believers because they depend, by Eberle’s own admission, upon perceptions and 
experiences that are distinct from the shared doxastic practices of human persons just in virtue 
of being human.  Even if it were true that all persons could have the doxastic practice of faith, 
it is not true that they actually have that doxastic practice in the same way that they possess the 
doxastic practice of the standard natural package. 
Returning to Eberle’s discussion of the perception of God in light of this observation, such 
a perception is admittedly not part and parcel of the standard package.  Persons who do not 
share that divine perception thus have no practice by which they might verify the very 
possibility, must less the reliability, of that mode of knowledge.  Prior to the experience of 
faith knowledge—i.e., insofar as they are human persons equipped with only the standard 
package of doxastic practices—they simply have no basis for trusting the reliability of claimed 
faith knowledge.  The person who has attained knowledge according to the standard package 
can easily accept the possibility of its exercise with respect to other conclusions reached by 
such means, even if he or she has not carried out those lines of reasoning.  To suggest that this 
provides any basis for asserting that a person equipped with the standard package therefore has 
a similar accessibility to faith based knowledge does not follow at all.  Imposing on non-
believers coercive standards of conduct based solely on doxastic practices proper to faith treats 
them as sub-human in so far as it attempts to direct their behavior by principles which they, as 
non-believers, are incapable of rationally adopting under their own existing doxastic practices.  
Limiting the direct epistemological basis of coercive laws to doxastic practices falling within 
the standard package—those practices available to all humans just as such—avoids this 
unfairness and manipulation of others.   
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The weakness of this argument, however, lies in its circularity.  Unless the 
religious believer advocates that religious beliefs are self-authenticating both in 
content and mode of assent—an unorthodox view—no “natural” reason exists for the 
non-believer to acknowledge the validity of a faith-based cognitive mode.  Non-
believers, however, might recognize the possibility of other natural rational grounds 
that they have not personally developed, for example reference to natural knowledge 
based merely on the trustworthiness of the testimony of another.  
In fact, precisely by reflecting upon Wolterstorff’s own argument against the 
existence of absolute independent foundations for knowledge, non-believers could 
consider the limited and conditioned nature of their own reflections and acknowledge 
the possibility of other forms that natural knowledge might take. Such an 
acknowledgment, however, would in no way entail recognition that faith in revealed 
matters is also a source of valid cognition.  Such a concession would require 
reference to a class of knowledge that a person who has not attained faith simply has 
no access to.  Nor would such a person be capable of presenting any plausible basis 
from which he might concede the recognition of such an appeal to be the product of 
natural reason alone. In short, recognition of the validity of religious beliefs accessed 
by faith is not an accessibility that a non-believer must naturally and rationally 
acknowledge. Faith cannot be rationally conceded as a legitimate mode of cognition 
prior to one’s having faith.69 
Accordingly, any argument that posits that religious beliefs can be reduced to a 
type of belief that possesses an equally legitimate claim in lawmaking necessarily 
runs up against the recognition of the difference between religious beliefs and 
secular beliefs articulated by those very religious belief systems themselves. As a 
                                                                
      
69Leiter has expressed this point in another context, stating: “There is no reason to think . . 
. that . . . beliefs that are insulated from evidence and reasons—that is, insulated from 
epistemically relevant considerations—will promote knowledge of the truth.”  Leiter, supra 
note 61, at 25.  As noted above, “insulated from evidence and reasons” need not imply that 
such truths are incapable of being known by reason, but simply that they cannot be known as 
such and still be matters of faith.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
      Also, it is important to note that this point does not entail that secular reason has any 
ground to deny, in a positive fashion, the possibility of knowledge by faith.  Rather, the scope 
of knowledge by faith is simply a method of knowing that is beyond the competence of natural 
reason to judge directly about.  Thus, while natural reason need not acknowledge the validity 
of knowing by faith prior to attaining such faith, it does not follow that knowledge by faith is 
therefore an impossibility. 
      Furthermore, such a position does not exclude the possibility that some beliefs bearing on 
“religious” content may also be accessible by natural reason.  Belief in the existence of a 
supreme being, for example, while certainly a preamble, if not part and parcel, of knowledge 
by faith, has been regarded throughout much of Western history, from ancient Greece onward, 
as a possible object of knowledge attained by natural reason. While admittedly such 
conclusions are not without controversy, it is undeniable that they suggest a distinction 
between rational arguments, probable or demonstrative, about the existence of God, and 
assertions about God’s existence or other truth offered directly as a matter of revelation.  See 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 629-30 (1987) (“[T]o posit a past creator is not to posit 
the eternal and personal God who is the object of religious veneration.  Indeed, it is not even to 
posit the ‘unmoved mover’ hypothesized by Aristotle and other notably nonfundamentalist 
philosophers.”); see also John Finnis, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources, 51 
AM. J. JURIS. 107 (2006) (arguing on a philosophical basis for the rationality of affirming the 
existence of God and the relevance of this affirmation to political considerations). 
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consequence, Wolterstorff’s argument in favor of allowing religious reasons to be 
employed in lawmaking by attempting to collapse the relevant distinction between 
secular reasons and religious beliefs falters.  Wolterstorff’s view conflicts with 
traditional notions of the legal process as based on some sense of a shared natural 
rationality, even if, as he asserts, it is true that liberalism exaggerates the possibility 
of attaining a single shared set of rational principles.  
In general then, good reason exists justifying the theoretical and legal distinction 
between religious beliefs and secular rationales, especially as it relates to enactment 
of coercive laws relating to matters of fundamental importance to fellow citizens.70 
                                                                
70It is essential to note, however, as observed by Audi above, that this position does not 
exclude the possibility that religious beliefs as such can and should be causally instrumental in 
developing non-faith based rationales for political decision making by religious believers.  See 
discussion supra Part I.B.1 on secular rationales and liberalism.  For example, as Jürgen 
Habermas has argued:  
A comprehensive view of state neutrality that at the same time is understood to 
guarantee similar freedoms for every citizen is irreconcilable with the reductive 
generalizing of a secularist viewpoint.  Secularized citizens, insofar as they act in their 
role as such, should neither deny to religious standpoints the possibility of truth, nor 
contest the right of their believing fellow citizens to make contributions to public 
discourse in religious language. A liberal political culture can even expect from its 
secularized citizens that they will participate in efforts to translate relevant 
contributions from religious language into publicly accessible language. 
Jürgen Habermas, Stellungnahme, http://www.kath-akademie-bayern.de/contentserv/www. 
katholische.de/index.php?StoryID=195&PHPSESSID=f1a656418beff947dfecd567544e752a 
(author’s translation) (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). 
      Habermas’s view here appears similar, at least in some general aspects, to that envisioned 
by the Vatican:  
This is not a question of «confessional values» per se, because . . . ethical precepts are 
rooted in human nature itself and belong to the natural moral law.  They do not require 
from those who defend them the profession of the Christian faith . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . The fact that some of these truths may also be taught by the Church does not 
lessen the political legitimacy or the rightful «autonomy» of the contribution of those 
citizens who are committed to them, irrespective of the role that reasoned inquiry or 
confirmation by the Christian faith may have played in recognizing such truths. Such 
«autonomy» refers first of all to the attitude of the person who respects the truths that 
derive from natural knowledge regarding man’s life in society, even if such truths may 
also be taught by a specific religion, because truth is one.  
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the 
Participation of Catholics in Political Life para. 5-6 (Nov. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021
124_politica_en.html.  
      Some religious legal scholars, however, have objected to any demand for translation of 
religious thought into secular language as a basis for legitimate introduction of religious 
beliefs into coercive political conduct.  Richard Garnett, for example, has commented 
concerning Habermas’s view:  
It sounds like, at the end of the day, the developments in Habermas’s though[t] about 
religion have brought him only to the tired Rawlsian demand that religion translate 
itself, and remake itself, before it is admissible in public life. The author imposes a 
“criterion” for “religious belief systems” that hope to be “suitable players” in our new 
“universe[.”]  To which we might respond, . . . “sez who?”  
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5.  The Search for Public Reason 
Assuming that the preceding discussion has provided at least a probable 
argument supporting the propriety of the epistemic restraint against the direct 
employment of religious beliefs in enacting coercive norms,71 questions still exist 
about what type of secular rationales can adequately function as an appropriate basis 
for coercive laws. 
a.  The Supreme Court’s Mystery Passage 
In a certain sense, reflection upon the development of substantive due process 
analysis from Griswold v. Connecticut up through Roe v. Wade and beyond suggests 
that the Justices of the Supreme Court have not been deaf to political theory 
discussions concerning the demand to ground law in principles that must be 
acceptable to all rational citizens as such.  
According to this account, it was finally in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey that the Court succeeded in distilling in its pure form a non-debatable 
principle guiding substantive due process analysis, that is, the notion of “autonomy” 
or “liberty” as the pivotal concept encapsulating the essence of substantive due 
process rights.  As the Court declared:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and the mystery of 
human life.”72  Specifically referring to its prior case law, the Court noted that this 
liberty interest flows directly from its previous decisions.73 It arises from the right of 
                                                          
Habermas on Post-Secular Societies, http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2005/09/ 
habermas_on_pos.html (Sept. 23, 2005, 10:29 EDT).   
      While one might respond first by observing that Garnett’s comments seem at odds with the 
general thrust of the Vatican Note indicating a distinction between religious beliefs as such 
and “natural ethics,” it may also be observed, in passing, that even if a demand for translation 
is old and “tired,” it is indubitably the case that, from a historical perspective, the only older 
and more tired demand would be that no translation be made, i.e., that religious convictions 
may be coercively imposed as such upon non-believing citizens. 
71See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (“Although a determination 
of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a 
most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to 
make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important 
interests.”(footnote omitted)). 
72Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
      
73Id.; see also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 146-47 (1978) (“What a person is, what 
he wants, the determination of his life plan, of his concept of the good, are the most intimate 
expressions of self-determination, and by asserting a person’s responsibility for the results of 
this self-determination we give substance to the concept of liberty.”); Charles Fried, 
Correspondence, From Charles Fried, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977) (stating that the 
concept of privacy embodies the “moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others 
nor to society as a whole”). 
      Likewise, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the 
Court stated:  
That promise extends to women as well as to men.  Few decisions are more personal 
and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, 
than a woman's decision—with the guidance of her physician and within the limits 
specified in Roe—whether to end her pregnancy.  A woman's right to make that choice 
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human persons to make their own decisions about matters “involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy.”74 
Turning to the question of limitations applicable to such autonomous conduct, the 
Casey Court observed that if answers to the existential question facing each 
individual were dictated by the state—either positively or negatively—then the very 
nature of personal individuality and the rights that purportedly flow from it would be 
undermined: “Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the state.”75 
Developing its thinking further about the conditions of autonomy and its 
permissible limitations, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas (arguably one of the most 
important substantive due process cases since Casey), described more particularly 
the sort of reasons that cannot function as a basis for limiting autonomy.  In 
overruling its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick and striking down a Texas law 
prohibiting sodomy, the Court held not only that religious reasons must be excluded 
as a legitimate basis for enacting laws, but that non-religious, moral reasons are also 
an inappropriate basis for imposing limitations upon autonomy. 
Although acknowledging that moral reasons proceed from “profound and deep 
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which [persons] aspire and 
which thus determine the course of their lives,”76 the Court held that such bases were 
improper because “[t]he issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State 
to enforce these views on the whole society . . . .  ‘Our obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.’”77  In essence, moral reasons 
cannot justifiably be employed because citizens will inevitably reach contradictory 
positions about these matters.  Since they are not in principle accessible to all, it is 
unfair to impose limitations on liberty based on such biased perspectives.  
In sum, according to the Casey-Lawrence line of reasoning, although legal 
theorists, philosophers, and theologians may vehemently disagree about the purpose 
of human life or even about whether any such purpose exists, one principle that 
theorists in all fields would presumably agree upon is that human “persons,” as such, 
must be free to make decisions for themselves in these matters.  Like Descartes’ 
“cogito ergo sum,” everything else may be doubted or denied, but the inherent 
natural connection between autonomy, personhood, and a right to self-determination 
cannot be rationally denied. Moral reasons, however, like religious reasons cannot be 
shared by all rational members of society, and thus provide an inappropriate basis for 
coercive limitation on others’ autonomy, at least with respect to matters of 
fundamental rights. 
                                                          
freely is fundamental.  Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a 
central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.  
      The Court of Appeals correctly invalidated the specified provisions of 
Pennsylvania’s 1982 Abortion Control Act.  
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986). 
74Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
75Id. 
76Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). 
77Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
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b.  Rawls and Legitimate Reasons 
The operative philosophical underpinning of the statements in Casey and 
Lawrence thus parallels political conceptions similar to that developed by John 
Rawls in relation to his concept of public reason. Generally, such conceptions have 
been developed precisely in order to address the appropriate basis for determining 
“constitutional essentials” and delineating the parameters of “basic justice” in the 
context of a pluralistic society.  
As Rawls describes his position, every institution has its own “reason,” i.e., a 
particular rational way of formulating its plans, putting its ends in an order of 
priority, and making decisions according to this ordering.78  In a constitutional 
democracy, where the citizens themselves yield coercive political power over each 
other, Rawls proposes that such rational ordering must occur under a conception of 
“public” reason.79 
The complication, however, is that an essential characteristic and goal of 
constitutional democracy itself is to preserve a plurality of incompatible 
“comprehensive doctrines.”80  According to Rawls, the stability of the community in 
                                                                
78JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 212, 
212-13 [hereinafter The Idea of Public Reason]. 
79Id. at 213.  Public reason’s structure is definite and has five parts.  These are, according 
to Rawls:  
(1) the fundamental political questions to which it applies; (2) the persons to whom it 
applies (government officials and candidates for public office); (3) its content as given 
by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; (4) the application of these 
conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be enacted in the form of legitimate 
law for a democratic people; and (5) citizens’ checking that the principles derived 
from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.   
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 767 (1997), 
reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, § 1.1, at 574-75 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter 
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited] 
80See The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 79, at 766, reprinted in COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 79, at 573.  Rawls states:   
The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a diversity of 
opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.  Some of 
these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political 
liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work 
within the background of enduring free institutions. 
Fundamental Ideas, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
Distinguishing the treatment of religious belief, Rawls questions: “How is it possible for 
those holding religious doctrines, some based on religious authority, . . . to hold at the same 
time a reasonable political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional regime?” The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 79, at 780, reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra 
note 79, § 3.1, at 588.  Compatibility demands that these religious doctrines accept a liberal 
political conception for the right reasons, and not merely as a modus vivendi.  Id., reprinted in 
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 79, § 3.1, at 588.  Rawls holds that the constitutional regime is 
not stable if the adherents of religious doctrines accept democracy only as a modus vivendi to 
maintain civil peace, or if they accept the constitutional principles with only a very limited 
allegiance to them, prepared to disobey laws not in congruence with their positions.  Id. at 780-
81, reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 79, § 3.1, at 589.  In order to achieve stability, 
adherents of religious doctrines must accept the fact that, except for endorsing a reasonable 
constitutional democracy, there is no other way to ensure the liberties of their own adherents.  
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such a situation depends upon the confidence of its members that they will be able to 
attain their own goals without imposition of divergent, comprehensive views of 
reality that they do not share.  When such confidence erodes, the legitimacy of the 
state is put at risk. Citizens can no longer realize their own ideals as individuals but 
are unwillingly subjected to value systems that they hold to be directly repugnant to 
their own.  To allow citizens to enact coercive laws based upon such incompatible 
comprehensive views would cut at the heart of the stability of the community itself 
and entail a type of enslavement or utilitarian subjection of the person. 
The solution, according to Rawls, depends upon a theory of “political liberalism 
[which] applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself.”81 Rejecting the 
notion that in democratic voting one can virtuously vote in accordance with one’s 
own comprehensive view in all its particularity, Rawls notes that such a view fails to 
recognize the duty of civility owed to one’s fellow citizens based on an ideal of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is understood as a “rights” theory because it gauges the 
quality of relations between citizens not in aggregate utilitarian terms, but by norms 
that define the free interaction of persons upon a reciprocal agreement concerning 
the benefits and burdens of the constitutional structure. The crux of this reciprocal 
agreement is that each citizen must be willing to impose upon others only those 
burdens that he or she would be reasonably willing to bear.82 
Citizens, thus, are free and equal only to the extent that they agree to bear 
similarly the burdens and benefits of freedom. Reciprocity thus matches up with 
citizens’ awareness of a peculiar dilemma created by their comprehensive views. 
They recognize that comprehensive views involve beliefs and practices fundamental 
to their existence, that is, the very type of ideals they would desire the most freedom 
to implement into the structure of political life. At the same time, however, they 
recognize that they do not want their own freedom and comprehensive views 
impinged upon by others’ attempts to institutionalize their incompatible 
comprehensive ideals.83 
Rawls believes that the only way to escape the inevitable conflict arising from the 
clash of incompatible views must be found in the development and employment of 
“public reason”:  
[S]ince the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal 
of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty—the duty of civility—to 
be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
                                                          
They must recognize liberty of conscience and the principle of toleration, and Rawls suggests 
that these doctrines could formulate this idea by saying that such are the limits that God puts 
to our liberty.  Id. at 782-83, reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 79, § 3.2, at 590-91.  
81Fundamental Ideas, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 10. 
82This, in general terms, captures Rawls notion of the “original position:” “[S]ome point of 
view, removed from and not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of the all-
encompassing background frame-work, from which a fair agreement between persons 
regarded as free and equal can be reached.”   Id. § 4.2, at 23.   
83See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in which 
we must be willing to abide someone else’s unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the 
same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies.”). 
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principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the 
political values of public reason.84 
Specifically, Rawls limits the operation of “public reason” to those laws relating 
to “constitutional essentials” and questions of “basic justice” that arise out of an 
“overlapping consensus” of the community.85  “[O]ur exercise of political power is 
proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
rational.”86  Defining the character of these reasons more specifically, he states:  
[On] matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice . . . we are to 
appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning 
found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science 
when these are not controversial. . . . 
. . . [I]n discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice 
we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical 
doctrines—to what we as individuals or members of associations see as 
the whole truth—nor to elaborate economic theories of general 
equilibrium, . . . if these are in dispute.  As far as possible, the knowledge 
and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of justice 
and their application to constitutional essentials and basic justice are to 
rest on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens 
generally.  Otherwise, the political conception would not provide a public 
basis of justification.87 
It is noteworthy that Rawls acknowledges that public reason need not be based 
only on those rational principals that all members of society actually do accept.  
Rather, it must be based on that set of rational principles that all member of society 
would accept as reasonable, that is, if the citizens acted on principles satisfying the 
test of public reason.  Rawls summarizes this point as follows: 
                                                                
84Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78, § 2.1, at 217. 
85Id. § 2.1-.2, at 217-18.  Rawls characterizes these political conceptions of justice as 
broadly liberal in character.  By this he means three things: (1) they specify “certain basic 
rights, liberties, and opportunities;” (2) they assign a “special priority” to these rights, 
liberties, and opportunities; and (3) they affirm “measures” assuring “all citizens adequate all-
purpose means to make effective use” of their basic liberties and opportunities.  Fundamental 
Ideas, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 6.  See also The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 79, 
at 776, reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 79,  § 2.1, at 581-82.    
Rawls also explains that these conceptions are “political” for three main reasons: (1) they 
are “framed to apply solely to the basic structure of society, its main political, social, and 
economic institutions as a unified scheme of social cooperation;” (2) they are “presented 
independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine;” and 3) they 
are “elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society.”  The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78, § 4.1, at 
223.  
86Id. § 2.1, at 217.  
87Id. § 4.3, at 224-25. 
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Democracy involves . . . an equal share in the coercive political power 
that citizens exercise over one another by voting and in other ways.  As 
reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of 
reasonable religious and philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to 
explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could 
reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their 
freedom and equality.88 
C.  Plato’s Cave: The Good, and Public Reason 
In important respects, the project of public reason, as mirrored in both of the 
Supreme Court’s Casey and Lawrence opinions and the political theories of Audi 
and Rawls, follows a model of reasoning and political insight suggested by Plato in 
his Republic.  
1.  The Philosopher King and the Ordered Polis 
Consistent with his general theory of the separate forms and the participation of 
all beings in those forms, Plato maintained that once the universal, separate forms of 
things could be recognized apart from their determinate instantiation in individual 
things, those pure concepts, purged of all particularities, could then be applied to 
understand correctly the essence and proper functioning of all other individualized 
things. 
In its most familiar articulation in The Republic, Plato explains this 
epistemological-metaphysical model in the context of his “divided line” analogy of 
reasoning and the concept of “dialectic.”  Observing a similarity between material 
things, their models, and their images, e.g., in sculptures and reflections in water and 
mirrors, Plato proposes that a similar analogy exists between concrete individual 
things understood as images and reflections of separate intelligible forms or ideas.89  
By a process of dialectical reasoning, the philosopher is able to move from mere 
reflections of things to the concrete things themselves, and then from the concrete 
entities up to the pure intelligible ideas from which all intelligibility originates as a 
first principle of all other things.90  
                                                                
88Id. § 2.2, at 217-18 (emphasis added). 
89See PLATO, REPUBLIC (c. 360 B.C.), reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 
575, bk. VI, 510d-e, at 746 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey trans., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1961) (“The very things which they mould and draw, which have 
shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn as only 
images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by 
the mind.”). 
90Id. bk. VI, 510b, 511b-c, at 745-46.  Plato asserts:  
 By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to 
investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by 
means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a 
conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to 
a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it makes no use of 
the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only and progressing 
systematically through ideas. . . .  
 . . . .  
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Applying this dialectic model, Plato develops the famous “cave” analogy, 
wherein the philosopher purges himself from the vision of mere images by escaping 
into the sunlight of the day, whereupon he grasps the true form of the “Good.”91  
Having received that vision of the Good, the philosopher has the duty to return to the 
“cave” to order properly the reciprocal duties necessary for civic order: 
It is the duty of us, the founders, . . . to compel the best natures to 
attain the knowledge which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the 
vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the 
heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now 
permitted. 
. . . .  
 That they should linger there . . . and refuse to go down again . . . and 
share their labors and honors . . . . 
. . . .  
. . . [T]he law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class 
in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, 
harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another . . . and requiring 
them to impart to one another any benefit which they are severally able to 
bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state 
. . . with a view to using them for the binding together of the 
commonwealth.92 
                                                          
 . . . [B]y the other section of the intelligible, I mean that which the reason itself 
lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions not as absolute 
beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to 
speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting point 
of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so 
to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of 
sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas. 
Id.  
91Id. bk. VII, 514a-517d, at 747-50 (providing a general description of the cave analogy).  
In conclusion, Plato observes:   
But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the 
last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must 
needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is 
right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and 
itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that 
anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this. 
Id. bk. VII, 517b-c at 749-50. 
92Id. bk. VII, 519d-520a, at 751-52.  The philosopher states:  
Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom 
yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there.  For once habituated you will 
discern them infinitely better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of 
the “idols” is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the 
beautiful, the just and the good.  
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2.  Autonomy as Public Reason: The Ideal Form of Civic Good 
Consideration of constitutional substantive due process analysis as developed in 
Casey and Lawrence illustrates the logical connections between the Platonic model 
of political dialectic described above and the conception of public reason. 
The notion of autonomy as a guiding principle of substantive due process is 
derived, on the one hand, from a recognition of the irreducible, differing ways in 
which human persons may exercise their freedom in the attempt to realize or 
discover meaning in their lives, and on the other, by considering the detrimental 
impact on that self-realization that results from coerced imposition on that freedom 
of disputed religious or philosophical conceptions of the meaning of life.  By 
abstracting from all possible modes of human conduct, and idealizing them under the 
conception of autonomy, the Court identifies a property constitutive of every 
person’s identity as such, that is, as a unique individual with governance over their 
own life and, in a particular sense, a sui juris. 
Autonomy thereby becomes a formal property of civic respect when rooted in a 
notion of reciprocity whereby autonomy becomes the guiding norm of substantive 
due process. Limitations on such an ideal, however, when based on religious or 
moral grounds, unjustifiably interfere with civic reciprocity and formality.  As Rawls 
observes in defining the scope of public reason in relation to constitutional essentials 
and basic justice: “we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical 
doctrines—to what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole 
truth— . . . if these are in dispute. . . . Otherwise, the political conception would not 
provide a public basis of justification. ”93 
                                                          
Id. bk. VII, 520c, at 752. 
      Echoing back to the early methodological plan of the Republic, Plato had explicitly 
formulated his methodology of political insight by seeking to understand the form of justice as 
it exists in the state, so that it would then be possible to arrive at a notion of justice applicable 
to individuals: 
[I]f we found some larger thing that contained justice and viewed it there, we should 
more easily discover its nature in the individual man.  And we agreed that this larger 
thing is the city, and so we constructed the best city in our power, well knowing that in 
the good city it would of course be found.  What, then, we thought we saw there we 
must refer back to the individual and, if it is confirmed, all will be well.  But if 
something different manifests itself in the individual, we will return again to the state 
and test it there and it may be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing them 
against one another, as it were from the fire sticks we may cause the spark of justice to 
flash forth, and when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds.  
Id. bk. IV, 434d-435a, at 676.  
      This is possible, argued Plato, precisely because the existence of justice in the state must 
arise from its existence in the individuals who make up the polis: 
 Is it not . . . impossible for us to avoid admitting . . . that the same forms and 
qualities are to be found in each one of us that are in the state?  They could not get 
there from any other source.  It would be absurd to suppose that the element of high 
spirit was not derived in states from the private citizens who are reputed to have this 
quality . . . . 
Id. bk. IV, 435e, at 677.  
93Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78, § 4, at 224-25; see also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text.  
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Connecting the dots between Casey and Lawrence thus reveals a model of 
reasoning analogous to the conception of Platonic dialectic, moving from the 
variegated and divergent practices of human conduct to a pure form of autonomy 
embracing and explaining all those differences.  Similar to the pure notion of the 
Good that Plato abstracts from all particulars in the dialectic, it is precisely the bare, 
formal notion of autonomy which beats at the heart of substantive due process, 
ordering the relations among citizens. Reflecting upon its holdings in prior cases, the 
court in Casey visualizes a set of prior assumptions that culminate in an overarching 
insight about the most fundamental character of the human person and a 
corresponding legal right to self-determination according to that personal nature.94 
Having finally located the original source of this privacy right in the ideal of 
autonomy, and no longer encumbered with its manifestation in any particular 
concrete context, the Court is able to return to particular cases applying that 
universal and instantiating it.  In Lawrence, the Court analyzes the particular form of 
conduct in light of the ideal of autonomy isolated in Casey and considers whether the 
practice instantiates a form of autonomous liberty, in which case the practice must be 
protected.  Justice Kennedy reasons in Lawrence:   
In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of 
the person . . . , we stated as follows:   
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.”  
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.95 
As stated, the reasoning process reflects precisely the dialectic described by 
Plato:  
[B]y . . . the intelligible I mean that which . . . reason itself lays hold of by 
the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions . . . as . . . springboards so 
to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is 
the starting point of all, and after attaining to that . . . so to proceed 
downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of 
sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending 
with ideas.96 
                                                                
94See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.  
95Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
96PLATO, supra note 89, bk. VI, 511b-c, at 746.  See also supra text accompanying notes 
88-91 for a more detailed elaboration of “dialectic” in Plato.  
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Having attained in Casey the an unadulterated insight into the full nature of the 
substantive due process privacy right, Court is now able to apply reflexively that 
principle to this novel issue.  Through insight into the fact that homosexual conduct 
itself constitutes simply another mode of autonomously defining one’s existence and 
life’s meaning, the Court holds that such conduct must be protected under 
substantive due process. 
D.  The Critique of Pure Public Reason 
1.  Autonomy and “Ordered Liberty” 
The preceding account of the dialectical employment of a constitutional 
“autonomy” principle, as isolated in Casey and applied in Lawrence, no doubt offers 
logical completeness, simplicity and coherence.  Such a conception is naturally 
appealing to the extent that it offers an elegant foundation for the defense of 
important individual rights against governmental intrusion. 97  
Consideration of the etymological roots of the very concept of “autonomy” itself, 
however, suggests theoretical difficulties when applied as a principle of substantive 
due process.  The term derives from the Greek adjective ‘autonomos’ which is, in 
turn, constructed from the notions of “self” (autos) and “law” (nomos).98  In its 
functional linguistic reference, the concept denotes simply the operation of an entity 
exercising “control” over itself, i.e., a self-directing or self-guiding being. 
The problem that immediately suggests itself is the inaptness of this term to serve 
as a descriptor for a political principle that purports to regulate a set (and a rather 
large set at that) of self-determining beings. It is not clear how the concept of 
“autonomy” standing alone offers any normative content applicable to the ordering 
of multiple individual “autonomies” with each other—each with their own 
potentially conflicting modes of self-directing conduct.  The antinomy between the 
concept of a solitary “self” lying at the heart of the meaning of autonomy and its 
introduction as a principle of substantive due process “law” intended to guide the 
reciprocal relations of all citizens toward public order is, at a minimum, problematic 
if not an outright oxymoron.99 
                                                                
97See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Defining Cutting Edge Scholarship: Feminism and Criteria of 
Rationality, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 953 (1996).  Levit states: 
 The criteria used herein to evaluate the innovative successes of critical theories . . .  
are criteria of rationality.  These criteria for theory-building are generally accepted in 
the sciences and social sciences.  The criteria include: the cumulative, comprehensive, 
and converging evidence[,] . . . explanatory power, depth or constructivity; fertility or 
exploratory power; verifiability and falsifiability; social-technical power; and 
simplicity or elegance. 
 . . . .  
  . . . [S]implicity or elegance refers to a theory being distinguished as systematically 
unified and unifying, one which brings together the general and the particular, and 
which is largely devoid of special circumstances. 
Id. at 953-54.  
98See 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 807 (2d ed. 1989) (“autonomous . . . f. Gr. 
[‘autonomos’] making or having one's own laws, independent (f. [auto]- self, own + [nomos] 
law) + -OUS”).  
99I am indebted to Thomas A. Cavanaugh for help in developing this line of argument. 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
188 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:157 
In fact, the inability of the concept of autonomy alone to provide a functional 
standard of substantive due process is demonstrated when considered against the 
concept of “ordered liberty”—another constitutive ideal associated with substantive 
due process.  As described by Justice Harlan, “ordered liberty” denotes the contours 
of substantive due process in an “organized society”; that is, it references that the 
extent of political liberty must be construed specifically as the synthesis between the 
right of an individual to act in accord with their own liberty with the necessary 
strictures imposed upon that right in view of the right of other citizens to pursue their 
liberty: 
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot 
be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that 
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance 
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized 
society. . . .  The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this 
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from 
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.  That 
tradition is a living thing. . . .  No formula could serve as a substitute, in 
this area, for judgment and restraint.  
.  . . .  
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered 
against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been 
rationally perceived and historically developed.  Though we exercise 
limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no “mechanical yard-
stick,” no “mechanical answer.”  The decision of an apparently novel 
claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted 
principles and criteria. . . .  
“The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at 
large.  We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and 
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.  Even 
though the concept of due process of law is not final and fixed, these 
limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of 
our judicial process. . . .  These are considerations deeply rooted in reason 
and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.”100 
                                                                
100Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 44-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 
(1982).  In Romeo, the Court stated: 
 In determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause 
has been violated, it is necessary to balance “the liberty of the individual” and “the 
demands of an organized society.”  In seeking this balance in other cases, the Court 
has weighed the individual’s interest in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for 
restraining individual liberty.  
Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
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2.  The Analytic Limits of Autonomy 
Consistent with the demand of public reason, it is clear that limitations on 
autonomy would themselves be required to satisfy the criteria of public reason, i.e., 
they must be limitations that “all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.”101  
As Audi echoes this point:  “A liberal state exists in good part to accommodate a 
variety of people irrespective of their special preference for one kind of life over 
another; it thus allows coercion only where necessary to preserve civic order and not 
simply on the basis of majority preference.”102  While the substantive due process 
autonomy principle of Casey and Lawrence gives rightful recognition to the 
importance of self-determination in the constitution of personhood—a right that 
indubitably should be in an appropriate way protected by the law—it is questionable 
whether the concept of “automony” can offer out of its own resources any limitation 
upon itself that is consistent with the conception of public reason and yet adequate 
for securing ordered liberty. 
a.  Rawls’ Liberty Principle 
For Rawls, liberty stands as the first principle in his systematic political 
conception of justice as fairness.  This first principle, which Rawls assumes would be 
chosen in the “original position,” is articulated in his Theory of Justice: “[E]ach 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for others.”103  In describing more particularly the mode to be 
employed in devising such limitations, he concedes that liberty can be limited only 
“by the common interest in public order and security.”104 The determination is to be 
made only when “there is a reasonable expectation that not doing so will damage the 
public order.”105  
Thus, at the foundation of Rawls’ conception of liberty is the acknowledgement 
that it must be subject to limitation.  Any such limits, however, argues Rawls, can 
only be made “for the sake of liberty itself.”106  In applying this principle, he 
proposes that all “basic liberties must be assessed as a whole, as one system,”107 
wherein the parameters of any one basic liberty depends upon the specification of all 
the rest.  Although recognizing the unavoidably abstract nature of his position,108 
Rawls argues that the limitation of basic liberty is only justifiable if done “to insure 
that the same liberty or a different basic liberty is properly protected and to adjust the 
one system of liberties in the best way.”109  
                                                                
101Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78, § 2, at 217. 
102AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 36, at 16-17.  
103JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971). 
104Id. at 212. 
105Id. at 213. 
106Id. at 204. 
107Id. at 203. 
108Id. at 205 (“These remarks about the concept of liberty are unhappily abstract.”). 
109Id. at 204. 
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Using liberty of conscience as an example, Rawls suggests that such 
determinations must be made from the “original position.”110  Accordingly, in 
keeping with his general methodology, such limitations must themselves pass muster 
under public reason. Such limitations must be based only on “evidence and ways of 
reasoning acceptable to all.”111  While matters of dogma or faith could never justify 
limitation on liberty—because these would not in principle be acceptable to all112—
any limitation based on a comprehensive doctrine that cannot be reconciled with 
public reason must also be excluded. 
b.  Kant’s Freedom Principle 
Rawls’ attempt proceeds generally according to an analytic mode of argument, 
that is, by means of a conceptual unpacking of the implications of “liberty” as a 
political ordering principle.  Citizens in the original position are to distill an inherent 
limitation to its exercise based on principles that any rational citizen could accept 
regardless of the role they are to play in society.  Specifically, the limitation on an 
individual’s exercise of autonomy is logically restricted whenever it unjustifiably 
interferes with the autonomy of another citizen. If autonomy is to serve as a 
comprehensive, overlapping account of our general relations, it is obvious that 
individual autonomy will necessarily come into direct conflict with the autonomy of 
others. Those competing “autonomies,” irrespective of their particular form, will thus 
have to be “conceptually” integrated with one another. Such an analysis introduces 
limitations upon the meaning of autonomy in its employment as a concept of public 
reason. 
This attempt to describe the limitations upon autonomy required for public order, 
both in form and substance, appears to follow closely a Kantian model of practical 
thinking.  In terms of form, it proceeds from a reflection on the logical implications 
of a concept of reason itself, rather than any “empirical” argument concerning what 
should limit autonomy.  As Kant remarked concerning the method of any true theory 
of obligation:  “[T]he ground of obligation . . . must . . . be sought . . . a priori solely 
in the concepts of pure reason . . . .”113  As to substance, of course, Kant believed that 
autonomy, as opposed to heteronomy, was the only mode of conduct appropriate for 
a rational being as such.114  It is precisely the concept of an agent acting 
                                                                
110Id. at 212-13. 
111Id. at 213. 
112Id. at 216 (“Where the suppression of liberty is based upon theological principles or 
matters of faith, no argument is possible.  The one view recognizes the priority of principles 
which would be chosen in the original position whereas the other does not.”). 
113IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 5 (Lewis White Beck 
trans., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1985) (1785). 
114By “autonomy,” Kant understands a person acting not from any conditional 
heteronomous principle, but a will acting according to its own maxim, namely, one that has as 
its object itself considered as giver of universal laws:   
 This principle of humanity and of every rational creature as an end in itself is the 
supreme limiting condition on freedom of the actions of each man. . . .  
 By this principle all maxims are rejected which are not consistent with the 
universal lawgiving of will.   The will is thus not only subject to the law but subject in 
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autonomously that yields the categorical imperative:115 a law governing autonomy 
that simultaneously demands integration with the concept of allowing for other’s 
autonomy as rational agents or “ends.”116 
Specifically applying the categorical imperative to one’s external conduct in a 
political community composed of other rational ends, Kant states: “‘[S]o act 
externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law.’”117 Thus, clearing the road that Rawls would 
eventually follow, Kant posits an inherent delimitation of the contours of freedom 
based upon the analytic requirements of its conceptualization when applied to a 
corporate body of rational, free individuals.  “‘[I]f a certain use of freedom is itself a 
hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws . . . , coercion that is 
opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom 
in accordance with universal laws . . . .’”118 Any interpretation of the meaning of 
autonomy that would allow for an interference with others’ autonomy contradicts the 
categorical imperative to act according to universalized principles.  Such 
“autonomous” conduct would properly be prohibited because it is not in keeping 
with the logical extension of the meaning of autonomy rationally understood as a law 
of persons. 
An illustrative application is found in Kant’s argument against suicide.119  In 
committing suicide a person uses his or her autonomy or freedom in a way that 
destroys that very autonomy: 
[I]f I kill myself, I use my powers to deprive myself of the faculty of 
using them.  That freedom, the principle of the highest order of life, 
should annul itself and abrogate the use of itself conflicts with the fullest 
use of freedom.  But freedom can only be in harmony with itself under 
certain conditions; otherwise it comes into collision with itself.120 
                                                          
such a way that it must be regarded also as self-legislative and only for this reason as 
being subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).  
Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
115Id. at 39 (“There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative.  It is: Act only according 
to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”).  
116Id. at 53.  Kant states:  
Reason, therefore, relates every maxim of the will as giving universal laws to every 
other will and also to every action toward itself; it does so not for the sake of any other 
practical motive or future advantage but rather from the idea of the dignity of a 
rational being who obeys no law except that which he himself also gives. 
Id.  
117IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 56 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1797), quoted in Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159, 163 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
118Id. at 57, quoted in Wright, supra note 117, at 164. 
119See Michael J. Seidler, Kant and the Stoics on Suicide, 44 J. HIST. IDEAS 429 (1983) 
(providing discussion of varying arguments and their arguable weaknesses). 
120IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 123 (Louis Infield trans., Hackett Pub. 1963) 
(1924); see also Seidler, supra note 119, at 451 (“Kantian freedom is not merely the absence 
of internal or external constraints . . . in carrying out the moral law; rather, through its link (or 
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Suicide is thus analytically determined to be impermissible because it contradicts the 
fundamental maxim to act autonomously, i.e., to have as a maxim of your will an 
object that can be a universal law.  Civic laws against “autonomously” destroying 
autonomy are rationally demanded because “‘coercion . . . (as a hindering of a 
hinderance to freedom) is consistent with freedom.’”121 
3.  The Antinomy of Autonomy as Public Reason 
Just as Rawls conception of the notion of autonomy parallels in relevant ways 
Kant’s analytic theory of liberty, so too the weakness of Rawls position falls subject 
to the familiar critique of Kantian ethics.122  With perhaps the exception of suicide, 
the determination about whether any particular form of conduct would constitute “a 
use of freedom that is a hinderance to freedom,” or in Rawlsian terms, whether such 
a limit on autonomy was necessary for the “for the sake of liberty itself,” remains 
substantively underivable.   
Hegel first articulated the “empty formalism” critique against Kant as follows:  
However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned 
self-determination of the will . . . owing to the thought of its infinite 
autonomy, still . . . without . . . transition to . . . ethics, . . . this gain [is] an 
empty formalism . . . .  From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of 
duties is possible . . . .  [I]f the definition of duty is taken to be the absence 
of contradiction, formal correspondence with itself—which is nothing but 
abstract indeterminacy stabilized—then no transition is possible to the 
specification of particular duties nor, if some such particular content for 
acting comes under consideration, is there any criterion in that principle 
for deciding whether it is or is not a duty.  On the contrary, by this means 
any wrong or immoral line of conduct may be justified.123 
                                                          
identity) with rational autonomy, it is the very root or source of the moral law itself.”).  Kant’s 
lectures date from 1775 to 1780.  
121KANT, supra note 117, at 57, quoted in Wright, supra note 117, at 164. 
122See G.C. Field, Kant’s First Moral Principle, 41 MIND 17, 19 (1932) (“The notion of 
the test of universalisation as a practical criterion has been unanimously rejected by the critics, 
and doubtless with good reason.  The arguments against it are probably familiar to every 
student in the elementary stages of moral philosophy.”). 
123GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 135, at 89 (T.M. Knox 
trans., Clarendon Press 1952) (1821) (Remark).   
 While . . . the outlook of Kant’s philosophy is a high one in that it propounds a 
correspondence between duty and rationality, still we must notice here that this point 
of view is defective in lacking all articulation.  The proposition: ‘Act as if the maxim 
of thine action could be laid down as a universal principle’, would be admirable if we 
already had determinate principles of conduct.  That is to say, to demand of a principle 
that it shall be able to serve in addition as a determinant of universal legislation is to 
presuppose that it already possesses a content.  Given the content, then of course the 
application of the principle would be a simple matter.  In Kant’s case, however, the 
principle itself is still not available and his criterion of non-contradiction is productive 
of nothing, since where there is nothing, there can be no contradiction either. 
Id. § 135, at 253 (Gans Addition).  
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Hegel observes that an analytical inquiry that professes to offer self-extracting, 
universally valid moral truths inevitably fails to offer any basis for developing 
specific norms for determining permissible action. 
Along similar lines of critique, the quasi-analytic treatment of autonomy 
suggested by Rawls fails to yield an adequate account of the limitations upon 
autonomy that any concrete state of affairs would demand.  Ordered liberty cannot 
be understood to be constituted in any practically relevant sense through a purely 
conceptual limitation on the abstract reciprocity of autonomy between citizens.  No 
matter how obscure the language, to assert that liberty is permissible unless it 
interferes with liberty,124 or that autonomy is permissible unless it interferes with 
autonomy,125 is nothing more than a tautology, true but unhelpful.  An adequate 
theory of ordered liberty must introduce independent normative content.  It must 
identify specific sorts of autonomous actions that do or do not constitute legitimate 
burdens upon liberty, or impose unjustified harms to public order.  Mere overlapping 
consensus with respect to a general rational conception of justice as fairness—where 
fairness is understood precisely as liberty restrained only by the naked “categorial” 
demands of public reason—would simply be vacuous as a standard for devising any 
actual, concrete public order. 
The difficulty arises from the fact that any rational principle that could be 
forwarded as a valid specific limitation of autonomy would arguably violate the 
demands of public reason excluding all comprehensive, idiosyncratic views of what 
is good or bad.126  Similar to the well-trod critiques of Kant’s categorical imperative 
founded upon the demand for universalizing norms, public reason seems unable to 
yield little, if anything, in terms of practical substantive content. 
These considerations support the conclusion that the very ideal of public 
reason—as promising to furnish a conception of basic justice all citizens could agree 
with—inevitably begs the question about the meaning of ordered liberty from the 
beginning.  Apart from public reason’s bald claim, no evident rationale supports its 
grandiose postulation that a reductive abstraction of all citizens’ rational political 
values and practices bearing on ordered liberty could yield a consensus that would, 
in any meaningful, i.e., practical way, be employed in bringing about such a state of 
affairs.127 
The question of whether particular exercises of autonomy threaten civic order or 
not, inevitably demands introduction of particular normative principles; these are 
neither self-evident to all nor self-generating from the concepts of autonomy or 
liberty.  Substantive due process decisions deal with specific forms of conduct, 
specific rights and obligations, specific benefits and harms, and, as such, inevitably 
draw in citizens’ comprehensive evaluations concerning how these diverse forms of 
conduct impact upon the conservation of public order.  While undoubtedly some 
very general commonalities might be found among citizens’ varying conceptions of 
                                                                
124See supra Part I.D.2.a for Rawls’ argument. 
125See supra Part I.D.2.b for Kant’s argument.  
126See supra note 87 and accompanying text for definition.  For arguments against public 
reason, from a communitarian critique, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS 
OF JUSTICE (1982). 
127See Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78, § 5, at 227-30. 
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the paradigm of public order, such generalizations would, precisely in their 
abstraction, provide an insufficient basis for specifying any particular citizen’s 
conception of ordered liberty, much less instantiating an actual public order that all 
citizens’ could in principle agree upon.128  Public order is not an abstract state of 
affairs, but a concrete, more or less determinate normative state of citizens’ relative 
rights and obligations. 
The attempt to draw out an adequate theory of substantive due process from a 
public reason concept of autonomy is destined to fail, both with respect to its pledge 
to furnish a foundation for civil rights and as a basis for limiting them.129  Such an 
approach is deficient because it attempts from its implausible “original position” to 
describe conditions necessary for achieving a concrete political state of affairs 
(reciprocal autonomy and ordered liberty) by prescinding from all individualizing 
accounts.  In so doing, however, it inexorably but erroneously ends up treating those 
states of affairs as if they were abstract ideals.   
Conceptions of “autonomy” or “ordered liberty” must properly be understood to 
refer not to abstractions, but to differing determinate conceptions of civic order.  
These, of course, are inescapably subject to the selfsame clash of individual views as 
all other aspects of existence dependent upon comprehensive human views.  Simply 
stated, public reason fails because it dismisses the depth and character of the very 
political pluralism which it purportedly mediates.130  By attempting to refine the 
                                                                
128This thesis does not exclude the conclusion that, from an objective point of view, 
optimal forms of conduct conducive to human flourishing exist, nor does it undercut 
arguments that a universal set of moral principles exist that are, in principle, knowable by all 
human persons.  See infra note 130.  The thesis does propose, however, that coming to “know” 
or “recognize” those specific forms of conduct and such moral norms is not intuitive, but 
demands satisfaction of a more complex and contingent set of conditions.  See, e.g., Martin 
Rhonheimer, The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity, 67 
THOMIST 1, 39-44 (2003) (discussing the complexity of knowing the particular propositions of 
the “natural law”).  
129See supra Part I.C.2 discussing the role of the conception of autonomy in both 
generating substantive due process rights and limiting those rights by extension of the concept 
based solely on the citizens’ reciprocal autonomy.  
130In critiquing and ultimately rejecting the concept of public reason, I limit my discussion 
primarily to Rawls’ conceptions of public reason and its realization on a “populist” and not 
“ideal” understanding.  As Joseph Raz observes: “[P]olitical principles must be accessible to 
people as they are. . . .  Politics must take people as they come and be accessible to them, 
capable of commanding their consent without expecting them to change in any radical way.”  
Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 3, 46 
(1990).   As Christopher Eberle describes this sense of public reason, 
populist conceptions of public justification resist idealizing the members of the public: 
they resist identifying a public justification with what citizens could or would accept if 
they were to enjoy certain moral or epistemic desiderata, that is, if they found 
themselves circumstanced very differently from the way they do in fact. 
EBERLE, supra note 68, at 200.  
      Thus, present discussion does not apply to descriptions of versions of ideal public reason 
that have been offered that avoid both the preceding critique of Rawls’ overly vacuous 
conception of public good and that are not proposed as “populist” conceptions of public 
reason.  My thesis does not require, and is in fact entirely consistent with, the possibility of an 
alternative form of practical public reason, i.e., with positing the existence of particular shared 
principles of specific principles of practical reason that all human persons would possess 
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conceptual meaning of ordered liberty to a level of purity satisfying the demands of 
public reason, Rawls idealizes “ordered liberty” out of existence.  Public reason does 
not so much explain the conditions necessary for autonomy and ordered liberty as 
explain them away.  
III.  PUBLIC OR PRACTICAL REASON? 
A.  Aristotle’s Racetrack:  The Good and Practical Reason 
The preceding discussions have posited a theoretical connection between the 
Platonic dialectic and the insufficiency of public reason theories to provide an 
adequate account of political deliberation.  In confirmation of this argument, and as a 
suggestive guide for development of a more adequate theory, the following section 
examines Aristotle’s critique of the Platonic dialectic and his alternative theory of 
practical political reasoning. 
1.  Rejection of the Ideal Form of Good 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle—though himself a member of Plato’s 
Academy for many years—distances131 himself from the Republic’s model of 
practical dialectic as dependent upon a vision of the Ideal Form of the Good.132  In 
questioning the particular good or end sought by political science (understood by 
Aristotle as the most comprehensive and important science),133 he raises for 
consideration the view of some who propose that “there is another [good] which is 
                                                          
under more or less ideal epistemic and formative circumstances.  See generally Robert P. 
George & Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law and Liberal Public Reason, 42 AMER. J. JURIS. 31 
(1997).  
131Aristotle states: 
 We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is 
meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms 
have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be 
better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what 
touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers; for, while both are dear, piety 
requires us to honour truth above our friends.  
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (c. 350 B.C.), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 1729, bk. I, ch. 6, 1096a11-16, at 1732 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D. Ross & J. O. 
Urmson trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984).  See, e.g., Hellmut Flashar, The Critique of 
Plato’s Theory of Ideas in Aristotle’s Ethics (1965), reprinted in 2 ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE 1 
(Jonathan Barnes et. al. eds., 1977). 
132See discussion supra Part I.C.1 on the vision of the Good in Plato.  
133Aristotle offers:  
[S]ince politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what 
we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include 
those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man.  For even if the end is 
the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events 
something greater and more complete both to attain and to preserve; for though it is 
worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain 
it for a nation or for city-states.  These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry, being 
concerned with politics, aims.  
ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. I, ch. 2, 1094b3-12, at 1729-30. 
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good in itself and causes the goodness of all these [other things] as well”134 and who 
therefore propose that a proper ordering of political affairs requires a vision of that 
Idea.135 Aristotle, though noting the position’s “plausibility,” observes that, as a 
matter of fact, it is contrary to actual practice. None of the sciences or arts proceeds 
on such a model.136  Instead, each science and art has its own specific end and object 
of investigation, while none of them make use of the abstract “[I]dea [of] Good” in 
pursuing knowledge about its subject.137  
To justify this fact, Aristotle observes that among the goods aimed at by human 
activity, some are sought for their own sakes (e.g., intelligence, vision, and certain 
other pleasures and honors), while others are sought as means to those objects.  But, 
Aristotle observes, if actions thought to be goods in themselves are good only 
because they participate in another goodness, the “Form of Goodness,” then that 
idea must be the good in itself, and those other objects would be pursued only insofar 
as they participate in it.  If this is true, however, Aristotle points out, the conception 
of the good would have no substantive content, and hence no meaning: “What sort of 
goods would one call good in themselves? . . .  [I]s nothing other than the Idea good 
in itself?  In that case the Form will be empty.”138  
If, on the other hand, as appears to be the case in the sciences and arts, the other 
objects or actions are correctly judged to be goods in themselves, they cannot be 
understood as good by virtue of a single concept or Idea of Good.  Rather, the 
meaning of “goodness” must be distinct and described with particularity for each art 
or inquiry.  The general concept of the Good, even if it obtained, would be 
practically useless.139 
                                                                
134Id. bk. I, ch. 4, 1095a27-28, at 1731. 
135
“[S]ome one might think it worth while to have knowledge of it with a view to the 
goods that are attainable and achievable; for, having this as a sort of pattern we shall know 
better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them shall attain them.” Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 
1096b35-1097a3, at 1733. 
136
“This argument . . . seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences . . . .  Yet that all 
the exponents of the arts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid is not 
probable.” Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 1097a3-4, 6-7, at 1733. 
137Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 1096b20, at 1733.  Aristotle asserts:  
[A]ll of these, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, 
leave on one side the knowledge of the good. . . .  It is hard . . . to see how a weaver or 
a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this ‘good itself’, 
or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general 
thereby.  For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way, but the health of 
man, or perhaps rather the health of a particular man; for it is individuals that he is 
healing.  
Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 1097a4-13, at 1733-34. 
138Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 1096b16-17, 20-21, at 1733-34. 
139Aristotle explains: 
But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the 
good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is 
identical in snow and in white lead.  But of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in 
respect of their goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse.  The good, therefore, is 
not something common answering to one Idea.  
Id. bk. I, ch. 6, 1096b21-26, at 1733. 
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2.  The “Perception” of Good 
While Plato proposed that the singular entities in the world—as mere images of 
the separate realities—could never be properly grasped until known as participations 
in universal, separate forms, Aristotle held that the grasp of things obtains, not 
through knowledge of separate forms, but rather precisely by a grasp of the 
intelligibility in the very things themselves.  
In understanding the natures of particular things, Aristotle believed that the 
starting point requires an appropriate grasp of the particular itself, by means of which 
an actor is able to assimilate himself to the known, both in its formal and particular 
characteristics.140 Once such knowledge is grasped, practical reasoning involves the 
process of forming judgments about new experiences in light of those known forms 
and principles.  Accordingly, for Aristotle, the origin of the formal principles of 
knowing is heavily dependent upon the grasping of particular things through the 
formulation of one’s sense of knowledge of particular objects.141 
                                                                
140Aristotle remarks: 
[T]he soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either sensible or 
thinkable, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation is in a way what 
is sensible: in what way we must inquire.   
 . . . Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these 
objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible.  They must be either the 
things themselves or their forms.  The former alternative is of course impossible: it is 
not the stone which is present in the soul but its form.   
 It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, 
so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.   
 Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible 
spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the 
abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things.  Hence, no one can 
learn or understand anything in the absence of sense . . . .   
ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL (c. 350 B.C.), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 
supra note 131, at 641, bk. III, 431b20-23, 431b26-432a7, at 686-87 (J.A. Smith trans.). 
      
141Aristotle asserts: 
[A]s in the case of the first principles; the fact is a primary thing or first principle.  
Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a 
certain habituation, and others too in other ways.  But each set of principles we must 
try to investigate in the natural way, and we must take pains to determine them 
correctly, since they have a great influence on what follows.  For the beginning is 
thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are 
cleared up by it.  
ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. I, ch. 7, 1098b2-8, at 1736.  The philosopher further states:  
Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or ultimates; for 
not only must the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding 
and judgment are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates.  And 
comprehension is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the primary 
definitions and the ultimates are objects of comprehension and not of argument, and in 
demonstrations comprehension grasps the unchangeable and primary definitions, 
while in practical reasonings it grasps the last and variable contingent fact . . . .  For 
these are the starting-points of that for the sake of which, since the universals are 
reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this is 
comprehension. 
Id. bk. VI, ch. 11, 1143a32-b6, at 1805-6.   
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Applied in the context of practical knowledge, Aristotle follows through on this 
line of reasoning by arguing, as noted above, that an actor’s rational judgments about 
practical goods depends necessarily upon his or her prior dispositional states in 
relation to the experience of those objects.142 While Aristotle accepts that certain 
types of conduct more fully actualize human faculties rather than other, he 
emphasizes that the grasping of objects as goods is not an intuitive process: 
“[A]bsolutely and in truth the good is the object of wish, but for each person the 
apparent good.”143   
Rather, judgments about objects as practical goods to be pursued or as evils to be 
avoided depends, to no small degree, upon the operation of performative dispositions 
of one’s faculties which affect how one judges the particular:   
[A]s in the case of bodies . . . the things that are in truth wholesome are 
wholesome for bodies which are in good condition, while for those that 
are diseased other things are wholesome—or bitter or sweet or hot or 
heavy . . . .  For each state of character has its own ideas of the noble and 
the pleasant . . . .144 
For Aristotle, ethical judgments about conduct presuppose the operation of a 
synthetic “feedback” model of practical knowledge.  The practical principles one 
employs in making judgments about the objects of action depend in large part upon 
the actor’s dispositional grasp of good and bad with respect to those goods.  
Applying general principles in the judging of new experiences presupposes the 
influence of prior dispositions affecting the determination of the principles through 
which one will “grasp” or “see” the new state of affairs.  One’s prior habituations 
and formed values then influence the very selection of the judgments and practical 
principles one views as relevant in evaluating the particular situation at hand. 
In Aristotle’s account, this sui generis aspect of practical reasoning, involves a 
unique form of practical “perception”:  
That practical wisdom is not knowledge is evident; for it is, as has 
been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be 
done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to comprehension; for 
comprehension is of the definitions, for which no reason can be given, 
while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is 
the object not of knowledge but of perception—not the perception of 
                                                                
142Aristotle explains: 
[I]n one word, states arise out of like activities.  This is why the activities we exhibit 
must be of a certain kind . . . .  It makes no small difference, then, whether we form 
habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, 
or rather all the difference.  
Id. bk. II, ch. 1, 1103b20-22, at 1743. 
143Id. bk. III, ch. 4, 1113a23-24, at 1757.  Aristotle continues:   
[P]erhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of 
things, being as it were the norm and measure of them.  In most things the error seems 
to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is not.  We therefore choose the 
pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil.  
Id. bk. III, ch. 4, 1113a32-1113b1, at 1758. 
144Id. bk. III, ch. 4, 1113a26-32, at 1757-58. 
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qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we 
perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that 
direction too there will be a limit.  But this is rather perception than 
practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception.145 
Excluding practical reasoning as a type of “knowledge” (by which he means 
“science” or demonstrative unchanging knowledge), and also excluding its 
characterization as “comprehension” (by which he refers to self-evident principles 
that require no proof and which form the basis of all thinking), Aristotle reaffirms the 
particularity and contingency of practical judgments. By analogously describing 
practical knowledge as a type of perception or sensation, he draws attention to the 
fact that such judgments depend intimately upon the agent’s dispositional habituation 
toward particular states of affairs. 
3.  The Practical Dialectic 
Plato, of course, had seen the key to practical insight concerning political order 
and good as culminating principally in a terminal grasp of the abstract, universal 
Form of Good.  Only by a grasp of that universal could a philosopher king 
understand how to order the chaos of the world of reflections.  Although Aristotle 
declines to follow Plato in positing a univocal, formal idea of goodness through 
which all realities can be grasped, he does, nonetheless, recognize the operation of a 
dialectical process in practical deliberation. Aristotle’s approach to practical 
reasoning, however, effectively inverts the emphasis of the Platonic dialectic.  
In the context of his rejection of the Platonic Idea of the Good, Aristotle proposes 
the following description of practical reason’s methodology:  
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between 
arguments from and those to the first principles.  For Plato, too, was right 
in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, ‘are we on the way 
from or to the first principles?’  There is a difference, as there is in a race-
course between the course from the judges to the turning-point and the 
way back.  For, while we must begin with what is familiar, things are so 
in two ways—some to us, some without qualification.  Presumably, then, 
we must begin with things familiar to us.  Hence any one who is to listen 
intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about 
the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits.  
For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to 
him, he will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well 
brought up has or can easily get starting-points.146 
Rather than positing a resolution to the problem of practical reasoning in the 
attainment of the ethereal universal and consequent redemptive deployment into the 
world of shadowy particular contingents, Aristotle asserts that the key to success in 
practical reasoning begins with the “perception” of concrete individual things as 
goods precisely by virtue of one’s habitual dispositions.  For it is only based on such 
practical perceptions that the universal guiding principles of conduct can originally 
                                                                
145Id. bk. VI, ch. 8, 1142a23-30, at 1803. 
146Id. bk. I, ch. 4, 1095a-1095b, at 1731. 
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be derived at all, and, which in turn depend upon the operation of those dispositions 
in order to be effectively employed in subsequent practical deliberation and 
choices.147  While for Plato the movement of practical reasoning is focused on a 
remote universal terminus, the focus, for Aristotle, of practical reasoning in both its 
beginning and end, is inherently rooted in a “perception” of the particular;  it is 
concerned “with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this 
nature.”148 
It is no accident that the analogy chosen by Aristotle for practical reasoning is a 
“racetrack” rather than a “cave.”  Reference to the perception of “facts” functions 
both as the necessary starting line of all practical reasoning (as grasped through 
inchoate dispositional orientations), as well as the final goal or “finishing line” of 
such reasoning.  As a result of this dialectical “movement” from the particular back 
to the particular, one no longer acts tentatively from inchoate habit, but exercises a 
fully reflective, deliberate choice of particular human goods.149 
                                                                
147Aristotle explains: 
[T]his eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of excellence . . . ; 
for inferences which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-
point, viz. ‘since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature’, whatever it 
may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident 
except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about 
the starting-points of action.  
Id. bk. VI, ch. 12, 1144a29-36, at 1807.  One legal scholar describes the place of such 
dispositions with respect to its role in the genesis of practical judgments:  
 Character traits are psychological features of people that dispose them to regularly 
act in certain ways.  They do this by guiding both our perception of and our response 
to the world around us.  Depending upon the character traits a person has, different 
features of the world stand out to her; and, therefore, the world calls for certain 
responses from her.  In other words, a person’s character traits define her evaluative 
perspective on the world, making some things matter more than others and inducing 
her to perform certain actions rather than others.   
Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431, 1438-39 (2000) (footnote omitted)  “To a Virtuous person, certain 
actions are presented as practically necessary—as Kant might have put it—by his view of 
certain situations in which he finds himself.”  John McDowell, Are Moral Requirements 
Hypothetical Imperatives? I, in [SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 52] THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 
13, 14 (1978).  
148ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. VI, ch. 8, 1142a23-25, at 1803. 
149Aristotle reasons: 
It is possible to do something grammatical either by chance or under the guidance of 
another.  A man will be proficient in grammar, then, only when he has both done 
something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in 
accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself.  
 Again, the case of the arts and that of the excellences are not similar; for the 
products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they 
should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the 
excellences have themselves a certain character . . . .  The agent also must be in a 
certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, 
secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his 
action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.   
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss2/5
2007] REASON’S FREEDOM 201 
B.  Prudence and Imprecision 
1.  “Right Reason” as Phronesis 
Before relating Aristotle’s account of practical reasoning to a broader critique of 
the Casey-Lawrence conception of substantive due process as a “type” of public 
reason analysis, it is necessary to outline briefly Aristotle’s more general account of 
the “practically wise man,” the phronimos. 
In contrast to Plato’s view that the rational conception of the Form of Good 
provides a sufficient rational standard for judging particular instances, no such 
intellectual principle is forthcoming from Aristotle.  With respect to the quality of 
excellence in human action, Aristotle proposes that goodness in conduct is achieved 
simply by acting according to “right reason.”150  Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle 
does not offer a formal abstract principle as the primary correlate of “right reason.”  
Instead, he proposes his famous definition of virtue: Virtue “is a state concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way 
in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.”151  Acting according to 
right reason (orthos logos) involves choosing a mean between excess and defect as 
the “phronimos,” the person with “practical reason” would act. 
The difficulty with such a view, to the chagrin of numberless students of 
philosophical ethics, is that it appears to be just as “empty” as the Platonic Idea of 
the Good.  Philosophical dissatisfaction with Aristotle’s definition of virtue has been 
voiced precisely on the ground that he never provides a definition of “right 
reason.”152  For example, nowhere does Aristotle state that a biological teleology or 
                                                          
Id. bk. II, ch. 4, 1105a22-b1, at 1745-46.  Also, in defining the difference between natural 
virtue and true virtue, Aristotle makes the following observation:   
For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense 
by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or 
brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which 
is good in the strict sense—we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way.  
For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but 
without thought these are evidently hurtful.  Only we seem to see this much, that, 
while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may 
stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires thought that 
makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be 
excellence in the strict sense.   
Id. bk. VI, ch. 13, at 1144b3-14, at 1807-08. 
150Id. bk. VI, ch. 1, 1138b22-25, at 1797.  “[T]here is a standard which determines the 
mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance 
with right reason.”  Id.   
151Id. bk. II, ch. 6, 1106b36-1107a3, at 1748.  
152Consider, for example, the typical critique as formulated by J.L. Ackrill:  
 Moral virtue, according to Aristotle, must be combined with practical wisdom 
(phronesis), the virtue of practical reasoning.  This enables a man to decide on each 
particular occasion what would be fair or kind or generous—what would be the right 
thing to do. . . .  But how does Aristotle suppose that the phronimos . . . decides on the 
appropriate thing to do?  Does he calculate the possible consequences of alternative 
courses of action, or does he apply certain general rules? What is his final test or 
criterion of right action?  If we want practical guidance about what to do in a difficult 
situation, Aristotle sensibly recommends us to ask a good and wise man for his advice. 
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empirical utility is to function as the defining ground of the reasonable and good.  He 
nowhere specifies a definite set of principles by which the phronimos can determine 
what conduct is good and what is not, other than reiterating at different times and in 
different manners that acting according to “right reason” involves choosing a mean 
between excess and defect just as a man of “practical reason” would choose.153 
While it can be argued that Aristotle, in fact, attempts to describe with more 
particularity the nature of what constitutes “right reason” and the standard that fixes 
it, there is no denying that his conception of practical reason ultimately provides no 
detailed analytic principle by which to judge what constitutes “right reason.”  No 
“acid test” exists by which one might coherently deduce the permissibility of 
conduct by application of a logical principle, such as that attempted by Kant through 
the Categorical Imperative.154  
Such a conclusion, however, is entirely consistent with Aristotle’s view that the 
grasp of human goods flows not as logical deductions from ideas, but upon 
perceptual insights that are dependent upon dispositional habituations of the actor 
and that can only be known as they play out in the context of contingent affairs 
subject to an infinite variety of possibilities.  As Aristotle repeatedly asserts, in 
matters relating to practical choice, one cannot expect the same type of necessity that 
is found in scientific demonstration.  Rather, practical discussions seek “as much 
clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in 
all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts.”155   
                                                          
. . .  The moral philosopher, however, has an obligation to state what the aim or goal or 
criterion is, to which the phronimos looks in thinking out what should be done.  
Aristotle recognizes that he has this obligation, but it is not clear that he fulfills it.  
J.L. ACKRILL, ARISTOTLE THE PHILOSOPHER 138 (1981); see also WHITNEY J. OATES, 
ARISTOTLE AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 284-87 (1963).  Feldman similarly asserts:  
Within moral philosophy, virtue ethics has been vulnerable to the complaint that it 
lacks definitive prescriptivity because virtue ethics requires an interpreter—generally 
the virtuous person—to translate virtuous dispositions into specific actions.  This has 
led some philosophers to argue that virtue ethics cannot supply a complete moral 
theory since a moral theory must not only tell us what character traits to have but also 
what actions to take.  
Feldman, supra note 147, at 1450. 
153Aristotle himself recognizes the general problem stating: 
[W]e have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the 
excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of reason, 
let us discuss this. . . .   But such a statement, though true, is by no means illuminating; 
for in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we 
must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much or too little, but to an 
intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge 
he would be none the wiser—e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply 
to our body if someone were to say ‘all those which the medical art prescribes, and 
which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art’.  Hence it is necessary 
with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be 
made, but also that it should be determined what right reason is and what is the 
standard that fixes it.  
ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. VI, ch. 1, 1138b18-20, 25-35, at 1797-98.  
154See discussion supra Part I.D.2.b, 3. 
155ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. I, ch. 3, 1094b12-14, at 1730.  
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While such a position certainly cannot be taken as a simplistic basis for 
concluding that Aristotle is at bottom an ethical skeptic, it does imply that his 
conception of good conduct allows for wide variation given the variability of 
particular contingents.156  Such a perspective, however, confirms Aristotle’s view 
that alternative judgments about human conduct are constituted by and formed in the 
context of particularized perceptions of human goods: “But up to what point and to 
what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to 
determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; 
such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception.”157   
While, at first glance, there may appear to be a similarity between Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s concepts of practical reason in their lack of specificity, a pivotal 
distinction is found in what each posits as the reference for filling in that potentiality.  
The Platonic dialectic offers with scant explanation a purely formal conception of the 
Good as an adequate basis for ascertaining the nature of all particular goods 
irrespective of their character.  Aristotle rejects this conceptualization and argues that 
the Platonic dialectic fails because it does not recognize the irreducibly particular 
nature of the good.  Rather, judgments concerning the goods of human life, whatever 
those judgments may be, can only arise from particular experiences of “a good,” and 
those judgments in turn must be recognized to depend to a great degree upon 
habituation and dispositionally-influenced perceptions.  No judgments of human 
good can be reduced to mere logical or rational formalities. 
2.  Practical Reasoning 
A useful analogue for understanding this Aristotelian conceptualization of 
practical reasoning can be found in the substantial body of jurisprudential reflection 
given to the theory of negligence.  As courts and scholars have observed, jury 
instructions dealing with a negligence cause of action have generally been articulated 
in the vaguest manner,158 establishing the standard for “reasonableness” of conduct in 
the following succinct formulation: “‘Negligence is lack of ordinary care.  It is a 
failure to use that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used 
under the same circumstances. . . .’”159  In contrast to such a presentation, however, 
familiar academic articulation of the Learned Hand formulation provides what is 
regarded by some as a more precise analysis.160  A finding of negligence involves 
                                                                
156
“Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety 
and fluctuation [of opinion], so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not 
by nature.” Id. bk. I, ch. 3, 1094b14-16, at 1730. 
157Id. bk. II, ch. 9, 1109b20-23, at 1752.  
158See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About 
Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 595 (2002). 
159Id. (quoting N.Y. P.J.I. CIV. 2:10 (3d. ed. 2000)). 
160See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures 
of a Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 885 (1999) (stating that some 
academics “use Learned Hand’s well known formula for negligence . . . .”); JoEllen Lind, The 
End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 
251, 315 (2003) (“Learned Hand’s well-known formula for . . . negligence brings this home . . 
. .”).  Feldman asserts: 
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consideration of three variables:  1) the probability of injury created by one’s 
conduct; 2) the “gravity” or magnitude of injury should that probability obtain; and 
3) the interest that the actor must sacrifice or the burden the actor must suffer to 
eliminate that risk.161 
From a law and economics interpretation of the Hand formula (as popularized by 
Richard Posner and William Landes), these concepts are to be understood 
exclusively in economic terms and entail application of a utilitarian calculus.162  
Numerous scholars, however, have rejected such an interpretation, asserting that 
insofar as it conflicts with typical jury instructions, it is factually inconsistent with 
how negligence has been determined historically in the courts by juries, and further, 
that it fails to provide any adequate normative reading of how negligence should be 
applied.163  In sum, these arguments propose through various avenues that a law and 
                                                          
 In the contemporary academy, many who deride the reasonable person standard 
criticize it for its supposed indeterminacy, its failure to provide a sufficiently 
formulaic guide to conduct.  These critics tend to prefer an economic interpretation of 
negligence on the assumption that cost-benefit analyses or social welfare functions are 
more determinate than the reasonable person standard and therefore can guide conduct 
more specifically and concretely. 
Feldman, supra note 147, at 1464.  
161Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev’d on other grounds, 312 U.S. 
492 (1941) (“The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three 
factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the 
injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the 
risk.”). Hand’s model appears similar if not identical to the negligence standard of 
unreasonableness proposed in the influential Restatement (Second) of Torts:  
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of 
harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such 
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the 
particular manner in which it is done.   
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); see also Michael D. Green, Negligence = 
Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1605-06 (1997) (“The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, published some eighteen years later, reflects the Carroll Towing standard, 
providing a risk-benefit test for unreasonable conduct and negligence.”). 
162See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 1 (1987) (“[T]he common law of torts is best explained as if the judges who created the 
law . . . were trying to promote efficient resource allocation.”).  In fact, Landes and Posner go 
on to argue that not only negligence but also intentional tortious conduct is subject to a similar 
mathematical analysis.  Id. at 153; see also Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 
110 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Most proponents of the economic 
approach to negligence use as a starting point the formulation of the negligence standard 
provided by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.”). 
163See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 336 (1977) (“The purely economic man is 
indeed close to being a social moron.”); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, 
Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 283-85 (1996) (critiquing efficiency cost-
benefit utilitarian theories of negligence); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of 
the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 152 (2003) (questioning the 
interpretation of Hand’s formula); Green, supra note 161, at 1643 (critiquing the history and 
meaning of the Hand formula).  
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economics interpretation fails by attempting to reduce all human values to economic 
value.164  
As an alternative understanding of the Hand negligence standard, numerous 
scholars have argued that in fact it was never intended to be taken in economic 
terms,165 but was offered as an analogy or metaphor highlighting the demand in 
negligence analysis for consideration of a variety of relevant circumstances of 
concrete human conduct.  Interpreted in this light, far from demanding a 
commensurating reduction as is entailed by law and economics theories, the Hand 
formula seeks to insure a prudential, normative answer to the question of when an 
unintended injury to human persons or goods is or is not permissible.166 
                                                                
164J.M. Balkin states: 
We may ask whether market behavior is not itself simply a special case of human 
behavior—whether it too, is only one of a number of different forms of human choice, 
which in turn depend upon many different forms of human valuation and motivation.  
Human values and goals may take wealth maximization into account, but they may not 
be exclusively or even primarily concerned with it.  Human action and human decision 
may rest only in part on the type of reasoning acceptable to Landes’ and Posner’s 
reductive vision.  Ironically, then, the greatest problem with wealth maximization as a 
theory of human practical reason may be that it is insufficiently rich.  
J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1447, 1475-76 (1987) (reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 162) (footnote omitted). 
165See, e.g., Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992).  In Abrams, Posner 
explains:  
 An algebraic formulation of legal rules . . . has value in expressing rules 
compactly, in clarifying complex relationships, in identifying parallels between 
diverse legal doctrines, and in directing attention to relevant variables that might 
otherwise be overlooked. It is not, however, a panacea for the travails of judicial 
decision-making. In practice, the application of standards that can be expressed in 
algebraic terms still requires the exercise of judgment, implying elements of 
inescapable subjectivity and intuition in the decisional calculus. 
Id. at 796 (citation omitted). 
166Hand, for example, expressly rejects the view that such determinations can be reached 
by mathematical calculus.  In his earliest statement on the issue in Conway, Hand observes:  
 The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three 
factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of 
the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to 
avoid the risk.  All these are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate, 
and the second two are generally not so, even theoretically.  For this reason a solution 
always involves some preference, or choice between incommensurables, and it is 
consigned to a jury because their decision is thought most likely to accord with 
commonly accepted standards, real or fancied. 
Conway, 111 F.2d at 612.  As one court has observed citing Conway:  “Judge Hand did not 
assign numbers to the variables or factors or attempt to apply the formula mathematically.” 
Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 554 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000).  Similarly, another 
court has stated:  
 Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula does not yield mathematically 
precise results in practice; that would require that B, P, and L all be quantified, which 
so far as we know has never been done in an actual lawsuit.  Nevertheless, the formula 
is a valuable aid to clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of 
negligence and about the relationship among those factors.   
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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In this way, the Hand formula can easily be reconciled with the generality of the 
open-ended negligence instruction: “Negligence is the doing of something which a 
reasonably prudent person would not do, or the failure to do something which a 
reasonably prudent person would do, under circumstances similar to those shown by 
the evidence.”167  By means of such an instruction, the court directs a jury to consider 
everything that a reasonable person would consider in determining whether a 
defendant’s conduct was not simply economical, but reasonable.  As one legal 
commentator expressed this common sense connection between the traditional 
character of the jury deliberative function and the Hand balancing test:  “Stripped of 
rhetoric, . . . the so-called Hand factors are simply the core factors of any account of 
negligence.  These factors will be present under any theoretical conception of the 
reasoning processes engaged in by jurors.”168 
In keeping with this narrative of negligence theory, its connection to the 
Aristotelian conception of practical reason should be apparent. The proper 
formulation of negligence must be generic and abstract; it entails no intrinsic logical 
conceptions of good conduct, nor does it rely on any particular substantive value in 
predetermining what constitutes reasonable behavior. At the same time, however, it 
specifically references prudent and reasonable persons, along with their concrete 
decisions and practical judgments, as the criterion for judging reasonableness of 
conduct. 
Virtue ethics can arrive at prescriptivity when it is operationalized. Even if 
there is no formulaic way to deduce appropriate actions from definitions 
of the virtues, tort law’s thought-experiment procedure for inferring 
specific prescriptions based on the possession of particular virtues in 
particular situations shows that virtue-based evaluative inquiry can yield 
specific prescriptions for or against particular acts.169 
                                                          
      For further development of this line of argument see Edward C. Lyons, Balancing Acts: 
Intending Good and Foreseeing Harm—The Principle of Double Effect in the Law of 
Negligence, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453, 469-81 (2005). 
167CAL. B.A.J.I. CIV. 3.10 (2007). The Illinois and New York pattern jury instructions 
contain similar definitions:  
 When I use the word ‘negligence’ in these instructions, I mean the failure to do 
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something 
which a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those 
shown by the evidence.  The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would 
act under those circumstances.  That is for you to decide. 
ILL. P.J.I. CIV. 10.01 (2006).  
 Negligence is lack of ordinary care.  It is a failure to use that degree of care that a 
reasonably prudent person would have used under the same circumstances.  
Negligence may arise from doing an act that a reasonably prudent person would not 
have done under the same circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to do an 
act that a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same circumstances. 
N.Y. P.J.I. CIV. 2:10 (2006).  See generally Kelley & Wendt, supra note 158, at 629-30, 640-
41, 658. 
168Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person 
Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 863, 883 (2001).   
169Feldman, supra note 147, at 1450.  
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Reference to prudence—understood as “virtuous” judgments about what 
constitutes good conduct—echoes a view of right action dependent upon 
performative habits and dispositional states of the actor that cannot be captured 
appropriately by merely descriptive universal concepts or reasons.  The concept of 
reasonable action thus cannot be best understood to result from abstract 
considerations of human conduct in light of formulae that all citizens could rationally 
accept.170  Rather, to understand the reasons of the prudent and reasonable person as 
reasons demands inherent reference to character traits, dispositions and experience.171 
While discussions of the role of the jury in determining reasonability at common 
law will be touched upon again, this section seeks to illustrate that the concept of 
practical reasoning demands reference to “reasons” that cannot be derived 
adequately by consideration of universally accessible conceptualizations of value.  
Human goods, especially in the context of community life, are achieved by attaining 
particular objects and executing particular actions.  Consequently, rational judgments 
about reasonable conduct and the demands of community order inevitably draw upon 
a concrete particularity that cannot be accounted for merely by reference to concepts 
developed under a standard of public reason. 
The preceding discussion of negligence illustrates how an Aristotelian theory of 
practical reasoning can appropriately inform a substantive area of legal practice and 
theory.  Specifically, it exemplifies how an account of the practical dialectic offered 
by Aristotle and captured by the concept of the “reasonable, prudent person” can 
justify the imposition upon all citizens of particularized legal standards of behavior 
that are thought to be necessary for preserving the order of civic life.  Such 
restrictive determinations rooted in individualized judgments about particular matters 
of fact and values could, however, never satisfy the demands of Rawls’ concept of 
public reason.172 
                                                                
170Feldman states: 
 Viewing the reasonable person standard as a thought-experiment apparatus, which 
people can use to arrive at conclusions about which acts are inspired or rejected by the 
virtues of reasonableness, prudence, and due care together, will disquiet those who 
seek a more reductionist definition of negligence.  In general, virtue ethics opposes 
reductionist interpretations of moral and ethical concepts, denying that we can decide 
upon good or worthy conduct by applying formulas or algorithms. 
Id. at 1433.  
171See DAVID WIGGINS, A Sensible Subjectivism?, in NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 185, 194-202 
(3d ed. 1998) (1987); see also Feldman, supra note 147, at 1438 n.13.  
172See Idea of Public Reason, supra note 78 (Rawls’ conception of public reason).  That 
negligence determinations resist analytic or purely rational resolution is supported by the 
strong aversion to adopt “rules of law” and the conditions under which they may be adopted.  
As Justice Cardozo remarked: 
 Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken 
over from the facts of life. . . .  
 Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards 
of behavior that amount to rules of law.  The need is the more urgent when there is no 
background of experience out of which the standards have emerged.  They are then, 
not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially 
developed, and imposed from without.  
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1934).  Thus while the adoption of rules of 
law in negligence is generally to be resisted, they can at times be appropriate but only when 
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IV.  PRACTICAL REASONING AND AMERICAN LAW 
It can be argued along an analogous—if not identical—line of reasoning that a 
similar understanding of public practical reasoning is reflected in Supreme Court 
precedent dealing with the constitutional “ordered liberty.” 
Contrary to the inference about the full character of substantive due process 
reasoning that might too easily be drawn from isolated consideration of the Casey 
and Lawrence holdings,173 the Supreme Court’s full corpus of substantive due 
process analysis explicitly recognizes that the notion of “ordered liberty” cannot be 
captured by application of abstract concepts of autonomy.  Rather, the Court has 
specifically articulated that to the extent it relates to substantive due process, the 
scope of ordered liberty must be defined with reference to specific historical 
practices and community based convictions regarding civic constitutional order. 
A.  Liberty: Ideal or Action 
1.  Washington v. Glucksberg: The Reason of Fundamental Liberties  
In Glucksberg, a decision reached after Casey but before (and oddly never 
discussed by) the majority in Lawrence, the Supreme Court laid out in clear detail 
the proper framework for analyzing legal claims to fundamental liberty interests 
asserted under the Due Process Clause. The Court predicated this discussion on two 
undisputed principles:  (1) the Due Process Clause protects more than “fair process, 
and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint[;]”174 
and (2) assertions of governmental interference with anything other than a 
fundamental liberty interest will generally be subject only to a “rational basis” test.175 
In answering the critical question of whether some claimed conduct is to be 
protected as a fundamental interest and thus entitled to a “compelling interest” 
standard of review,176 the Court articulated two distinct, albeit interrelated, criteria.  
First, “the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”177  Second, the Court “required in substantive-due-process cases a 
                                                          
they are drawn from experience, “flower” naturally from customs and habits of conduct, and 
are not imposed artificially.  For further discussion of this point in the context of substantive 
due process, see infra notes 269-82 and accompanying text.  
173For such a reading, see supra Part I.B.5. 
174Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citations omitted).  For a listing 
of major substantive due process cases and holdings, see id at 719-20.  
175As, for example, Justice Souter notes in his concurring opinion in Glucksberg, “by 
insisting on a threshold requirement that the interest (or, as the Court puts it, the right) be 
fundamental before anything more than rational basis justification is required, the Court 
ensures that not every case will require the ‘complex balancing’ that heightened scrutiny 
entails.”  Id. at 767 n.9 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
176
“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . “fundamental” 
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” Id. at 721 (majority opinion) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
177Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 502, 503 (1977)). 
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‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”178  Summarizing 
the significance of these two principles, the Court observed:  
[T]he development of this Court’s substantive-due-process jurisprudence . 
. . has been a process whereby the outlines of the “liberty” specially 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment—never fully clarified, to be sure, 
and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified—have at least been 
carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights 
found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.  This approach tends to 
rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process 
judicial review.179  
The issue in Glucksberg was a claimed fundamental substantive due process right 
to physician-assisted suicide, a practice prohibited under the general provisions 
against assisting in suicides under the Washington State criminal code.180  In support 
of their claim, the plaintiffs argued that under prior Supreme Court precedent in 
Casey and Cruzan, such a practice constituted a fundamental liberty right 
unconstitutionally interfered with by state law.181  The plaintiffs asserted that as 
articulated in those prior cases, the Due Process Clause guaranteed a right to “‘self-
sovereignty’” and “‘basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy.’”182   
Consistent with this line of argument, the Glucksberg Court described the various 
ways in which the claimed right was portrayed by the Court of Appeals and the 
plaintiffs:  
Turning to the claim at issue here, the Court of Appeals stated that 
“[p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to be resolved is whether there is a 
liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one’s death,” or, in 
other words, “[i]s there a right to die?”  Similarly, respondents assert a 
“liberty to choose how to die” and a right to “control of one’s final days,” 
and describe the asserted liberty as “the right to choose a humane, 
dignified death,” and “the liberty to shape death.”183 
                                                                
178Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).  
179Id. at 722. 
180See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.36.060, 20.021(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  “A person 
is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to 
attempt suicide.”  § 9A.36.060(1).  “Promoting a suicide attempt is a . . . felony,” § 
9A.36.060(2), punishable by “confinement [not exceeding] five years, or by a fine . . . of ten 
thousand dollars, or by both,” § 9A.20.021(1)(c).  See also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707. 
181Plaintiffs were physicians who practiced in Washington and treated terminally ill, 
suffering patients and asserted that they would assist such patients in ending their lives absent 
the ban on assisted-suicide.  Also named as plaintiffs were three gravely ill, pseudonymous 
plaintiffs who died prior to the Supreme Court taking the case and the group “Compassion in 
Dying.”  See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707-08. 
182Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 10, 12, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) 
(No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708925).   
183Id. at 722 (citations omitted) (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 
790, 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1996), and Brief for Respondents, supra note 182, at 15, 18).  
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In short, the plaintiffs argued that the Court’s “liberty jurisprudence, and the broad, 
individualistic principles it reflects, protects the ‘liberty of competent, terminally ill 
adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue government interference.’”184 
Undertaking its own due process analysis, however, the Supreme Court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument. In particular, the Court focused on the second criterion, that is, 
the need for a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” and 
its prior precedent.185 In order to determine whether a particular practice constitutes 
part of the historical continuum, it is obviously appropriate to determine what the 
particular practice in question is. 
Considering first its holding in Cruzan, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt 
to describe the right found in that case as a broad right to “hasten one’s death.”186  
The Court noted that the narrow issue presented had been “whether Nancy Beth 
Cruzan, who had been severely injured in an automobile accident and was in a 
persistive vegetative state, ‘ha[d] a right under the United States Constitution which 
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment’ at her parents’ 
request.’”187  Noting its reliance on traditional common law doctrines of battery and 
informed consent to justify its decision, the Court held that “‘a competent person has 
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment.’”188 
Turning next to the plantiffs’ reliance on the Casey “mystery” passage,189 the 
Court observed that both of the lower courts had found that specific language 
“‘highly instructive’”190 and “‘almost prescriptive’”191 in reaching their conclusion 
                                                                
184Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 182, at 10).  
185Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).  
186The Court stated: 
 Respondents contend that in Cruzan we “acknowledged that competent, dying 
persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and 
thus hasten death,” and that “the constitutional principle behind recognizing the 
patient’s liberty to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support applies at least as 
strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal medication.”  
Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that “Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty 
interest that includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaining food and 
water, necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in hastening one’s own death.”  
Id. at 725 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 
182, at 23, 26, and Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816).  See also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).   
187Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724 (alteration in original) (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269). 
188Id. at 724-25 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278).  
189
“‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could 
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.’”  Id. 
at 726-27 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
190Id. at 726 (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 
F.3d at 813). 
191Id. (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 
813). 
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that the plaintiffs had a fundamental liberty interest in a “‘choice to commit 
suicide’”:192  “‘Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision 
how and when to die is one of the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, a choice central to personal dignity and autonomy.’”193 
In response, the Court acknowledged that in Casey it had reaffirmed the basic 
holding of Roe v. Wade regarding abortion194 based on a line of cases that involved 
matters of “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education” and that it also noted that “many 
of those rights and liberties ‘involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime.’” 195   
The Court, however, then made it clear in no uncertain terms that such 
observations could not be taken to suggest that every exercise of autonomy with 
respect to an intimate personal matter ipso facto constitutes a fundamental 
substantive due process right:  
By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a 
general way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and 
decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history 
and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally 
ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The opinion moved from the recognition that liberty necessarily includes 
freedom of conscience and belief about ultimate considerations to the 
observation that “though the abortion decision may originate within the 
zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise.”  
That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion 
that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so 
protected . . . .196 
As the Court suggested, such an interpretation would erroneously imply that 
substantive due process analysis was essentially a philosophical exercise, which, if 
so construed, would mischaracterize its nature.197 
                                                                
192Id. (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 
813). 
193Id. (second internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 
813-14). 
194The Court acknowledged:  
We held, first, that a woman has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion 
“without undue interference from the State”; second, that States may restrict 
postviability abortions, so long as exceptions are made to protect a woman's life and 
health; and third, that the State has legitimate interests throughout a pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the unborn child.  
Id. at 726 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).  
195Id. at 726 (alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).  
196Id. at 727 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).  
197The Court noted:  
 Respondents contend, however, that the liberty interest they assert is consistent 
with this Court's substantive-due-process line of cases, if not with this Nation’s history 
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Explicitly applying this possible misreading of the Casey autonomy principle 
back to its prior holding in Cruzan, the Court pointed out that the liberty interest in 
refusing medical treatment was not “simply deduced from abstract concepts of 
personal autonomy,” but also demanded consideration of the “Nation’s history and 
constitutional traditions.”198 Responding directly to the asserted autonomy argument, 
the Court stated: “The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may 
be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.”199 
2.  The Logic of Lawrence 
As numerous scholars agree,200 however, strong grounds exist for interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s recent Lawrence decision as the exact type of philosophical 
exercise that the Court had explicitly rejected in Glucksberg. Although the Lawrence 
Court did offer a controversial interpretation of the historical treatment of sodomy—
challenging the Court’s historical findings in Bowers—this revised history, on any 
reasonable reading, made no claim that acceptance of the practice of sodomy could 
be considered deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history.201  Rather, the 
argument in Lawrence appears to be simply that because sodomy is an aspect of 
homosexual persons’ exercise of personal autonomy, it deserves protection under the 
Due Process Clause.202 
In any event, even if one disagrees that this characterization correctly captures 
the majority’s reasoning in Lawrence, there is little doubt that it can be, and has 
                                                          
and practice.  Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our jurisprudence in 
this area as reflecting a general tradition of “self-sovereignty,” and as teaching that the 
“liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause includes “basic and intimate exercises 
of personal autonomy.” 
Id. at 723-24 (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 182, at 10, 12).  
The Court further states: “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey did not suggest 
otherwise.”  Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted). 
198Id. at 725. 
199Id.  The Court continued by noting the definite distinction between withdrawal of 
medical treatment and assisted-suicide: “Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably 
regarded as quite distinct.”  Id.; see also, Lyons, supra note 166. 
200See, e.g., David M. Wagner, Hints, not Holdings: Use of Precedent in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 681 (2004).  
201The Court in Lawrence stated:  
In academic writings, and in many of the scholarly amicus briefs filed to assist the 
Court in this case, there are fundamental criticisms of the historical premises relied 
upon by the majority and concurring opinions in Bowers.  We need not enter this 
debate in the attempt to reach a definitive historical judgment, but the following 
considerations counsel against adopting the definitive conclusions upon which Bowers 
placed such reliance.  
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 567-68 (2003) (citations omitted).  
202Id. at 574. 
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been, so read by lower courts.  In Williams v. Pryor,203 the ACLU, representing 
various individual users and sellers of sexual devices, brought an action challenging 
on federal substantive due process grounds a state law prohibiting the commercial 
distribution of devices used primarily for the stimulation of human genitals.204  
Specifically, the ACLU argued that “‘[b]y restricting sales of these devices to 
plaintiffs, Alabama has acted in violation of the fundamental [due process] rights of 
privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual’s lawful sexual practices 
guaranteed by the . . . United States Constitution.’”205 
Ruling in plaintiffs’ favor, the district court—after engaging in an elaborate 
disquisition on the history of sexual practices in the United States (stretching from 
the seventeenth century to the present)206—first concluded that the federal 
constitution guarantees a fundamental liberty interest in sexual privacy, or as it 
stated, demands “state non-interference with private, adult, consensual sexual 
relationships.”207  In addition, the court went on to observe that “this right to sexual 
privacy cannot be limited to a mere right to ‘sex,’ when the decisions of the Supreme 
Court protecting abortion, contraception, and the right to privacy of our bodies are 
considered.”208   
The court, applying this broad articulation of the right to sexual privacy, then 
questioned whether this general substantive due process right specifically included 
the “right to use sexual devices like the vibrators, dildos, anal beads, and artificial 
vaginas distributed by the vendor plaintiffs[.]”209 In answering this question 
affirmatively, the court found that “such sexual devices are used by individuals . . . to 
consummate the most private acts—whether they be medically, therapeutically, or 
sexually motivated.”210  Further, it observed that “[t]he user plaintiffs all have 
averred that their own use of these devices is contained within the confines of their 
adult sexual relationships.”211  Consistent with these conclusions, the court held that 
the plaintiffs’ fundamental due process right to sexual privacy included the use of 
such sexual devices.212 
                                                                
203Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d sub 
nom. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), on 
remand sub nom. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2005), aff’d 
sub nom. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. 
filed No. 06-1501 (U.S. May 14, 2007). 
204ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007).  
205Williams III, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 43, at 13-14, 
Williams III, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (No. CIV.A.98-S-1938-NE)). 
206Id. at 1277-94. 
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit repudiated the reasoning and conclusion of the 
district court.  In so doing, it gave considerable attention to a dissenting appellate 
judge’s assertion that Lawrence demanded the conclusion that a fundamental due 
process right exists to sexual privacy, including the right to use sexual devices.213  In 
her dissent, Judge Barkett observed that in Lawrence, the Supreme Court had 
explicitly rejected the reasoning in Bowers214 which had framed the due process issue 
in terms of the right to engage in a particular type of sexual act, that is, sodomy. 215  
Instead, the Lawrence Court considered the proper issue to be the general right 
implicated through particular sexual acts, i.e., the fundamental right to exercise one’s 
autonomy and thus constitute one’s personhood through sexual identity.216 
Consistent, however, with its view that Lawrence could not properly be regarded 
as a fundamental liberty substantive due process case,217 the court of appeals in 
                                                                
213Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004), 
on remand sub nom. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2005), 
aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for 
cert. filed No. 06-1501 (U.S. May 14, 2007). 
214Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
215
“‘To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward . . . .’” Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1255 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
216
“Bowers departed from the proper inquiry by focusing on a particular sexual act instead 
of upon the right to sexual privacy, which encompasses acts of adult consensual sexual 
intimacy.”  Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1255.  Referring specifically to the same argument 
offered in her dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc in Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 
2004), Judge Barkett cites in defense of this conclusion directly to Lawrence’s reliance on 
Casey’s mystery passage: 
 In overruling Bowers, Lawrence explained that  
“[O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. . . .  ‘These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.’”  
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1306 n.46 (11th Cir. 
2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)).  “The Court unequivocally stated that ‘[p]ersons in a 
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons 
do.  The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574). 
217The majority quoted Lofton: 
 “We are particularly hesitant to infer a new fundamental liberty interest from an 
opinion whose language and reasoning are inconsistent with standard fundamental-
rights analysis. . . .  That the Court declined the invitation is apparent from the absence 
of the ‘two primary features’ of fundamental-rights analysis in its opinion. . . .  Most 
significant, however, is the fact that the Lawrence Court never applied strict scrutiny, 
the proper standard when fundamental rights are implicated, but instead invalidated 
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Williams rejected the reasoning of both Judge Barkett and the district court.  
Specifically, the Court rejected the asserted claim to a fundamental liberty interest in 
the use of sexual devices because it failed under the required analysis demanded by 
Glucksberg, that is, a “‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest” and a determination of whether such conduct was “deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.”218 
In rejecting the district court’s broad formulation of the right at issue, the court of 
appeals in Williams cited to the Supreme Court’s rejection of a similarly framed 
generalized right in Glucksberg.  As noted, in Glucksberg, rather than limiting the 
issue to the question of a “right to commit suicide with another’s assistance,”219 the 
plaintiffs had attempted erroneously to frame the issue as a broad “right to ‘control 
of one’s final days,’” “‘the right to choose a humane, dignified death,’” or “‘the 
liberty to shape death.’”220  Similarly, the appellate court in Williams observed that 
although the district court had originally framed the issue properly as “‘whether the . 
. . right to privacy protects an individual’s liberty to use sexual devices when 
engaging in lawful, private, sexual activity,’”221 its final determination 
inappropriately described the issue more broadly as a question simply of the “‘right 
to sexual privacy.’”222 
Based on this overly broad description of the right at issue, the court of appeals 
found that the historical inquiry carried out by the district court was also 
overbroad.223  Although the district court’s sweeping review of the history of a wide 
                                                          
the Texas statute on rational-basis grounds, holding that it ‘furthers no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.’” 
Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1236 n.6. (quoting Lofton, 358 F.3d at 816-17).  
218Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 
292, 302 (1993), and Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 502, 503 (1977)). 
219Id. at 724; see also Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1241. 
220Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722 (quoting Brief for Respondents, supra note 182, at 7, 15, 
18).  See also discussion supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text; Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 
1240-41. 
221Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Williams v. Pryor (Williams II), 240 F.3d 944, 
953 (11th Cir. 2001), on remand to 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d sub nom. 
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), on remand 
sub nom. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp 2d 1224 (N.D. Ala. 2005), aff’d sub 
nom. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. 
filed No. 06-1501 (U.S. May 14, 2007).  Although the challenged Alabama statute prohibited 
only the commercial distribution of sexual devices, the majority in Williams IV conceded that 
such a prohibition for constitutional purposes “must be framed not simply in terms of whether 
the Constitution protects a right to sell and buy sexual devices, but whether it protects a right 
to use such devices.”  Id. at 1242.  
222Id. at 1239 (quoting Williams v. Pryor (Williams III), 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. 
Ala. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala. (Williams IV), 378 F.3d 1232 
(11th Cir. 2004), on remand sub nom. Williams v. King (Williams V), 420 F. Supp 2d 1224 
(N.D. Ala. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Morgan (Williams VI), 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 
2007), petition for cert. filed No. 06-1501 (U.S. May 14, 2007)). 
223The court of appeals stated: 
59Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
216 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:157 
variety of sexual practices predictably led it to the conclusion that a general right to 
“sexual privacy” existed,224 the court of appeals found such a conclusion irrelevant to 
the narrow substantive due process issue before it, noting additionally with particular 
emphasis the weakness of the historical analysis due to its heavy reliance on 
contemporary historical practice.225  Referencing Glucksberg’s admonition against 
courts drawing hasty substantive due process determinations,226 as well as quoting a 
similar sentiment expressed by Justice Frankfurter,227 the court of appeals held that 
the district court erred in concluding that the Due Process Clause protects as a 
fundamental liberty right the use of sexual devices.228   
In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals specifically considered and 
rejected the argument that application of the principle of autonomy standing alone, 
whether as articulated in Lawrence or any other Supreme Court decision, could 
justify the demands of fundamental liberty analysis.229  Citing its prior decision in 
                                                          
Given this over-broad starting point, the district court’s subsequent inquiry, 
predictably, was likewise broader than called for by the facts of the case.  The inquiry 
should have been focused not broadly on the vast topic of sex in American cultural 
and legal history, but narrowly and more precisely on the treatment of sexual devices 
within that history and tradition.   
Id. at 1242-43.  
224The court of appeals observed: 
 The district court began its Glucksberg-mandated history and tradition inquiry by 
defining its task as one of determining whether to “recognize a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy.”  After an extensive survey of the history of sex in American culture 
and law—replete with cites to the Kinsey studies and Michel Foucault—the district 
court concluded that “there exists a constitutionally inherent right to sexual privacy 
that firmly encompasses state non-interference with private, adult, consensual sexual 
relationships.” 
Id. at 1242 (citation omitted) (quoting Williams III, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1277, 1296).  
225
“While such evidence undoubtedly confirms the district court’s discovery of ‘the 
specter of a twentieth century sexual liberalism,’ its relevance under Glucksberg is scant.”  Id. 
at 1243 (citation omitted) (quoting Williams III, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1291). 
226The court of appeals reiterated by quoting Glucksberg: 
“By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a 
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.  
We must therefore exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new 
ground in this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” 
Id. at 1239 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). 
227The majority quoted Justice Frankfurter from Dennis v. United States:  
“Courts are not representative bodies.  They are not designed to be a good reflex of a 
democratic society. . . .  Their essential quality is detachment, founded on 
independence.  History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized 
when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary 
responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social 
pressures.”  
Id. at 1250 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in affirmance of the judgment). 
228Id.  
229The court of appeals reasoned:  
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Lofton v. Sec’y. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., the court rejected the 
assertion that Lawrence or any other prior cases had announced a generalized 
fundamental liberty right to sexual privacy flowing from a right to autonomy.230  
Judge Birch, in connection with that denial of a petition for rehearing in Lofton, 
specifically noted that the abstract and imprecise reasoning of Lawrence could not be 
relied upon to derive a fundamental liberty interest in sexual privacy: 
 
[T]he words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs used in Lawrence reveals 
. . . language from which we might infer any number of new rights, or 
even a new mandate in conducting constitutional review. . . . 
 . . . . 
. . . Of course, the Court will so depart from time to time . . . .  And 
those decisions are typically accompanied with clear guideposts for 
applying the new rule.  Lawrence does not appear to be such a case.  We 
find in the opinion no . . . guideposts; . . . no description of the scope of 
this putative fundamental right, no standard of review for scrutinizing 
infringements on that right, no balancing test, and so on.231 
3.  “Doing an Action” 
As J.L. Austin observed in his famous mid-20th century essay, “A Plea for 
Excuses”: 
The beginning of sense, not to say wisdom, is to realise that “doing an 
action”, . . . is a highly abstract expression . . . .  We treat the expression 
                                                          
 The ACLU invokes “privacy” and “personal autonomy” as if such phrases were 
constitutional talismans. In the abstract, however, there is no fundamental right to 
either.  Undoubtedly, many fundamental rights currently recognized under Supreme 
Court precedent touch on matters of personal autonomy and privacy.  However, “[t]hat 
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal 
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, 
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.” 
Id. at 1235 (citation omitted) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725, 727). 
230The court of appeals explained:  
In Lofton, we addressed in some detail the “question of whether Lawrence identified a 
new fundamental right to private sexual intimacy.”  We concluded that, although 
Lawrence clearly established the unconstitutionality of criminal prohibitions on 
consensual adult sodomy, “it is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of 
Lawrence to interpret it to announce a new fundamental right”—whether to 
homosexual sodomy specifically or, more broadly, to all forms of sexual intimacy.   
Id. at 1236 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and 
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815, 817 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 
2004)).  
231Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (Birch, 
J., specially concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); see also Williams IV, 378 F.3d at 
1236 n.5 (citing Lofton, 377 F.3d 1275 (Birch, J., specially concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc)). 
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“doing an action” . . . as a self-explanatory, ground-level description, one 
which brings adequately into the open the essential features of everything 
that comes, by simple inspection, under it. . . .  
. . . [W]e need to ask how we decide what is the correct name for “the” 
action that somebody did—and what, indeed, are the rules for the use of 
“the” action, “an” action, “one” action . . . and the like.  Further we need 
to realise that even the “simplest” named actions are not so simple—
certainly are not the mere makings of physical movements . . . .232   
The contrast in historical substantive due process analysis considered above 
captures with clarity the very point Austin intends to make.  Depending upon the 
generality or specificity of description, the aspects of conduct that one chooses to 
focus on or ignore, and the axiological context of such judgments, discrete 
descriptions of human conduct are susceptible to an almost infinite multivalence. 
Given that the same form of human behavior can be understood to instantiate so 
many different, even contradictory, ideals it comes as little surprise that this same 
instability should be reflected in due process analysis. 
By way of example, one need only consider the contrasting portrayals offered of 
homosexual conduct as described in Bowers233 and Lawrence, respectively.234  
Although the factual, physical character of such conduct does not vary, each view 
proposes a significantly different evaluative conceptualization of that conduct.  
Similarly, despite Lawrence’s reliance on Griswold as a taproot for the pivotal Casey 
autonomy principle it employs in striking down laws against sodomy,235 Justice 
Goldberg, in his concurring opinion in Griswold had specifically rejected any 
argument that the constitutional “privacy” right endorsed by the Court could be 
relied upon as a basis for legal protection of homosexual or extramarital sexual 
activity.236 
                                                                
232J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1, 4-
5 (1957), reprinted in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 6, 7-8 (Herbert Morris ed., Stanford 
Univ. Press 1961) (footnote omitted). 
233See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
234See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
235Id. at 564 (“There are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due 
Process Clause in earlier cases, . . . but the most pertinent beginning point is our decision in 
Griswold v. Connecticut.”). 
236Justice Goldberg states: 
 Finally, it should be said of the Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes 
with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct.  As my Brother 
Harlan so well stated in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,  
 “Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State 
forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and 
accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only 
must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and protected.”  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
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4.  Specificity and Extension of Due Process Rights  
Austin’s comments concerning the imprecise meaning of “an action” are thus 
quite germane to the substantive due process requirement that the conduct in 
question be defined at the proper level of specificity: “we need to ask how we decide 
what is the correct name for ‘the’ action that somebody did—and what, indeed, are 
the rules for the use of ‘the’ action.”237  As these reflections have illustrated, one of 
the difficulties in due process jurisprudence results from disagreements about which 
level of behavioral specification is the most appropriate locus for defining rights.  At 
issue in such disputes is the desire to insure that the criteria for arriving at the 
appropriate level of description not be determined on the basis of ad hoc judicial 
whim, but based on some principled reason or methodology. 
On one end of the spectrum is the solution offered by Justice Scalia in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D.238  In ascertaining whether some form of conduct is accepted or 
rejected as a component of societal traditions and therefore presumably entitled to 
fundamental due process protection, Justice Scalia suggests that courts should match 
relevant established societal traditions with the particular claims of due process 
protection at the most specific level possible.  Depending upon whether the traditions 
approve or disapprove of the specific conduct, substantive due process analysis 
should reach a corresponding decision to protect or deny constitutional protection.  If 
no relevant tradition exists, of course, the Court would presumably conclude that no 
fundamental right of due process protection is appropriate because the practice 
would not be deeply ingrained in the nation’s history and practice.239 
Two important objections to Justice Scalia’s approach are laid out in Justice 
Brennan’s dissent.  First, Scalia’s view provides an overly optimistic picture of what 
is involved in determining “societal traditions.” In fact, appeals to such traditions are 
themselves at times inevitably beset by complexities and controversies.240  While 
Brennan’s point may constitute an overly skeptical view of the ability to define 
                                                                
237Austin, supra note 232, at 5, reprinted in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 
232, at 8. 
238Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
239Id. at 127 n.6.  The Court stated:  
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying 
protection to, the asserted right can be identified.  If, for example, there were no 
societal tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child 
adulterously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the 
traditions regarding natural fathers in general. But there is such a more specific 
tradition, and it unqualifiedly denies protection to such a parent.  
Id.  
240Id. at 137-41 (Brennan, J, dissenting).  Justice Brennan argued: 
Apparently oblivious to the fact that this concept can be as malleable and as elusive as 
“liberty” itself, the plurality pretends that tradition places a discernible border around 
the Constitution.  The pretense is seductive; it would be comforting to believe that a 
search for “tradition” involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring 
through dusty volumes on American history.  Yet, as Justice White observed . . . 
“What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.” 
Id. at 137. (Brennan, J, dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 
(1977) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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traditions, it appropriately highlights the fact that often there will be a substantive 
dispute regarding the proper reading of history.241  Brennan’s argument is 
corroborated in light of the contrasting historical narratives regarding the societal 
treatment of sodomy found in Bowers and Lawrence. 
Brennan’s second objection is that Scalia’s position in principle forecloses the 
possibility of extending fundamental liberty protection to novel forms of behavior 
that do not match societal traditions with sufficient specificity. He notes that such a 
standard would have precluded the holding in many of the Supreme Court’s prior 
substantive due process cases.242  He argues that Scalia’s conception of due process 
analysis would be essentially redundant insofar as it functions merely to protect that 
which is already generally protected.243  In short, Brennan asserts that Scalia’s 
position is wrong because it conflicts in important ways with Justice Harlan’s 
assertion that “novel” issues of substantive due process can and will arise that cannot 
be mechanically answered.244 
                                                                
241For example, consider the disputed historical treatment of abortion in the United States 
and its impact on substantive due process decisions.  See generally  JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, 
DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTIONS HISTORY (2006); John Keown, Back to the Future of 
Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s History and Traditions, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 
(2006). 
242Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If we had asked, therefore, in 
Eisenstadt, Griswold, Ingraham, Vitek, or Stanley itself whether the specific interest under 
consideration had been traditionally protected, the answer would have been a resounding 
‘no.’”).  
243Id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan reasoned: 
[B]y describing the decisive question as whether [the plaintiffs’] interest is one that 
has been “traditionally protected by our society,” rather than one that society 
traditionally has thought important (with or without protecting it), and by suggesting 
that our sole function is to “discern the society's views,” the plurality acts as if the 
only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confirm the importance of interests 
already protected by a majority of the States.  Transforming the protection afforded by 
the Due Process Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with care and purpose, 
wrote the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
      Scalia’s response to this argument as evidence of his restrained approach to due process is 
worth noting: “Nor do we understand why our practice of limiting the Due Process Clause to 
traditionally protected interests turns the Clause ‘into a redundancy.’  Its purpose is to prevent 
future generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values—not to enable this 
Court to invent new ones.”  Id. at 122 n.2 (citation omitted).  
      
244See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan 
maintained that:  
      Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a 
background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and 
historically developed.  Though we exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment, 
yet there is no “mechanical yardstick,” no “mechanical answer.”  The decision of an 
apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-
accepted principles and criteria.  The new decision must take “its place in relation to 
what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.” 
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 
147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
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On the other hand, as arguably occurred in Glucksberg, Lawrence, Williams, and 
Lofton, the attempt to characterize particular concrete forms of behavior under more 
abstract conceptualizations of constitutional rights (e.g., the attempt to describe 
suicide as a form of “death with dignity” constituting the exercise of self-autonomy 
guaranteed by Casey and Cruzan)245 entails its own problems.  Defining and 
protecting behavior as described under higher levels of abstraction has the obvious 
risk of inflating the right claimed, thus creating constitutional protection for a 
potentially wide range of conduct beyond that actually brought before the court in a 
specific case.246 
In Justice Scalia’s view, the problem such abstraction creates is that it becomes 
unclear what normative or methodological basis can legitimately be introduced to 
limit the logical space created by these expanded concepts.  In articulating this point, 
Justice Scalia notes Justice Brennan’s view in Michael H. that the constitutional 
meanings of “family” and “parenthood” should not be limited to their traditional 
historical connotation, although explicitly conceding that the resulting abstractions 
have no clear content: “[e]ven if we can agree, therefore, that ‘family’ and 
‘parenthood’ are part of the good life, it is absurd to assume that we can agree on the 
content of those terms and destructive to pretend that we do.”247  Scalia objects that 
the inevitable result of such an indefinite methodology inevitably cedes the right to 
define the unknown contours of those “rights” to future judicial fiat.248 
B.  The Praxis of Ordered Liberty 
The preceding section illustrates in broad strokes the dispute raging in Supreme 
Court due process analysis.  Does some specific quality of past practice establish a 
due process right to certain forms of conduct?  If such practices can be accurately 
ascertained, will the extension of such right be limited only to those specific 
practices?  Is the entire effort to tie due process rights to past practices even a 
legitimate or appropriate methodology in light of a person’s right to autonomous 
self-determination?   
1.  Experience and Knowledge of Civic Good 
In a significant way, the very persistence of these incompatible views of 
substantive due process demands that heed be given to Aristotle’s observation that in 
                                                                
245See supra Part III.A.1.  
246Consider, for example, the broad implication of Brennan’s description of basic 
constitutional due process values:  
“‘[L]iberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms.  They are among the ‘[g]reat 
[constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience. . . .  
[T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who 
founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.’”  
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 138 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (second, third, 
fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)). 
247Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
248Id. at 128 n.6 (majority opinion) (“Although assuredly having the virtue (if it be that) of 
leaving judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs, a rule of law 
that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”). 
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matters of action one should only seek “as much clearness as the subject matter 
admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions.”249  To take 
this warning seriously suggests that due process analysis ought to be viewed not so 
much as a process of pure logic, but as an exercise in practical perception. 
As Aristotle observed about the concept of the Platonic Good,250 and as has been 
recognized about the bare concept of autonomy as a principle of public reason,251 
such abstract concepts are, from a practical point of view, empty.  Autonomy can 
describe virtually every self-directing form of behavior and standing alone it offers 
no rational basis for legally distinguishing among forms of personal conduct.  If one 
applied Ronald Dworkin’s notion of the “gravitational force” of precedent252 to the 
concept of Casey autonomy, it would have the pull of a “black hole”—dragging 
every form of conduct into its grasp and letting nothing escape.253  
But application of a legal principle that provides no basis for drawing relevant 
distinctions epitomizes arbitrariness and capriciousness.  Accordingly, because the 
whole point of due process analysis is precisely to avoid purely arbitrary decision-
making, it must inevitably depend to some degree upon particular judgments 
concerning (relatively) specific forms of human behavior.  Inevitably applying an 
Aristotelian approach in reaching these determinations, however, will necessarily 
entail an experience-based method.  While there may be, as even Justice Brennan 
hypothesizes, a “good life” for a community of human persons, i.e., ordered liberty, 
the process through which society attempts to constitute that order can be derived 
from nothing other than reflection upon the experience of citizens’ human choices; 
choices that can have as their object only a good as perceived in a particular form, 
and as thus perceived, characterized at a particular level of specificity. 
Rather than deducing rights by evaluating conduct in light of some purely 
abstract ideal (such as autonomy as a form of public reason), due process decisions, 
ultimately, are not about ideals but about human behaviors, and behavior is not an 
abstraction.  Such determination may, of course, as in most other areas of law, be 
obtained in differing degrees.  The exercise of some behaviors may be judged as 
necessarily demanded by the concept of public order and past practice, while others 
are judged utterly incompatible.  With respect to other types of conduct, clear 
consensus might not exist and debate remains about whether public order requires, 
excludes, or is not affected by those forms of conduct. 
                                                                
249ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, bk. I, ch. 3, 1094b12-13, at 1730. 
250Id. bk. I, ch. 6, at 1732-34.  
251See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1309 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
252See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977) (“The gravitational force 
of a precedent may be explained by appeal . . . to the fairness of treating like cases alike.  A 
precedent  . . . provides some reason for deciding other cases in a similar way in the future.”).  
253For use of the same analogy, see Michael B. W. Sinclair, What is the “R” in “Irac”?, 
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 476 (2002).  
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2.  Ordering as the End of Phronesis 
As argued above,254 the formulation of negligence law can be understood to 
represent a model of practical reasoning that tracks the Aristotelian model of 
practical reasoning.  Based on this analogy, it can be argued in turn that a similar 
type of analysis might also be employed as a model for properly encapsulating the 
character of substantive due process analysis. 
While this claim may initially appear implausible, it is striking how normative 
descriptions of negligence theory track language describing “ordered liberty.”255  
Consider, for example, Richard Wright’s description of negligence law understood 
as a form of justice:  
[J]ustice requires that others who interact with you in ways that may affect 
your person or property do so in a way that is consistent with your right to 
equal negative freedom, and vice versa.  It does not prohibit all adverse 
impacts, or risks thereof, on others’ persons and property.  Such a 
prohibition would greatly decrease each person’s external freedom rather 
than enhancing it. It rather allows a person to engage in conduct which 
creates risks to others’ persons and property, but if and only if the 
allowance of such conduct by everyone in similar circumstances will 
increase everyone’s equal freedom, rather than increasing some persons’ 
external freedom at the expense of others’ external freedom.256   
Arthur Ripstein makes a similar point describing the rationale for imposing 
restraints on freedom under the negligence standard:  
[T]he reasonable person is the one who exercises appropriate restraint in 
light of the interests of others.  The reasonable person is a construct to 
strike a balance between different interests. . . .  Decisions about such 
matters invariably import substantive judgments about what is important 
to a person’s ability to lead a self-directing life.  Such matters will 
occasionally be controversial, though most such interests—freedom of 
action and association on the one hand, and bodily security and security of 
possession on the other—will not.257 
In fact, modest reflection on such texts reveals a clear commonality linking the 
two bodies of law.  Each in its own domain seeks to provide a minimal net of legal 
principles that simultaneously constitute and protect civic order, and each does so 
precisely by defining the outer contours of individual freedom demanded by the 
recognition of a reciprocal freedom of other citizens.  Freedom to act must be 
restricted whenever reasonable persons would view conduct as unfairly interfering 
with another citizen’s reasonable freedom to pursue his or her own ends. 
                                                                
254See supra Part II.B.2. 
255See supra Part I.D.1. 
256Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 
143, 166 (2002). 
257Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 656, 663 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
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Of course, as Ripstein points out, other than some basic rights and restrictions 
that everyone presumably agrees are absolutely necessary for civic order, the 
particular form that such ordering takes inevitably proves controversial and 
debatable.  Human persons can disagree in so many ways about what constitutes the 
nature of civic order and what actions are necessary or detrimental to it. 
3.  “Rules of Law” and Reasonable Differences 
It is in connection with this very last point, however, that the most suggestive 
parallel between negligence and due process analysis emerges.  The foundation for 
this comparison depends upon the distinction in negligence cases between cases in 
which the judge instructs the jury with the ordinary “prudent, reasonable person” 
instruction, and the rarer type of negligence case in which the jury is supplied with a 
“rule of law” that describes in specific detail the behavior that characterizes the 
actions of a reasonable, prudent person. 
Classic discussion of the distinction is found in Pokora v. Wabash Railway 
Company,258 a case involving the issue of whether a driver who was injured by a 
locomotive was negligent in failing to comply with dictum of a prior Supreme Court 
case requiring that “‘[I]f a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is 
dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle.’”259  Justice Cardozo, 
writing the opinion of the Court, rejected application of this “rule of law” holding 
that such a standard could not appropriately determine the standard of reasonableness 
required under all circumstances: “In such circumstances the question, we think, was 
for the jury . . . .”260   
While not rejecting the possibility that rules of law defining the contours of 
reasonable behavior by human persons may at times be appropriate, he cautioned 
that such instances would be rare and could only be ascertained as a result of 
common experience:  
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they 
are taken over from the facts of life.  .  .  . 
 Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in 
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law.  The need is the 
more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the 
standards have emerged.  They are then, not the natural flowerings of 
behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and 
imposed from without.261 
Applying this negligence distinction to due process reasoning suggests a relevant 
analogy to the distinction between “rational basis” analysis and “fundamental 
liberty” analysis.  In negligence cases that are left to the jury, the court recognizes 
that it is not in a position to state as a matter of law what constitutes the demands of 
                                                                
258Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).  
259Id. at 102 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927)). 
260Id. at 101.  
261Id. at 104-05.  
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reasonable conduct required for public order.  It leaves that decision to the prudential 
judgment of the jury applying its particularized standard of reasonability.262   
Similarly, in cases involving garden variety substantive due process “rational 
basis” review, no constitutional rule fixes an appropriate ordering of civic conduct.  
Rather, substantive due process leaves that prudential decision to the states’ 
judgments, subject only to a requirement that it be supported by some rational state 
interest, that is, that it be reasonable. 
This restrained assessment of the ability of courts to determine the requirement of 
due process liberty is reflected in Glucksberg.  In view of the lack of traditional 
support for physician-assisted suicide, the Court denied the plaintiffs’ claim to 
constitutional due process protection under the bare notion of “autonomy” and held 
that the matter should be resolved by the democratic process.  “Throughout the 
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the 
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits 
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”263 
In negligence “rule of law” cases, however, courts are prepared to impose a 
standard of conduct that sets out in absolute terms the demands of reasonable civic 
conduct.  As Justice Cardozo indicated, however, courts are reluctant to do this 
because such determinations admit of wide variation.264  So too, in cases involving 
substantive due process fundamental liberty claims, courts are cautioned to be 
reluctant to determine new absolute rules of conduct establishing fundamental rights 
or prohibitions against conduct.265  As articulated in Glucksberg, courts should only 
do so when the claimed right or prohibition satisfies the criteria of being rooted in 
history and defined specifically, that is, similar to the requirements in other legal 
contexts, when it is rationally justifiable to impose rules of conduct as a matter of 
law upon all citizens.  
                                                                
262Jury verdicts are reviewed for rational basis, the operative question being whether the 
decision is supported by a reasonable interpretation of the evidence.  A court’s “sole function 
is to ascertain whether there is a rational basis in the record for the jury's verdict; [it is] 
forbidden to usurp the function of the jury by weighing the conflicting evidence and inferences 
and then reaching [its] own conclusion.”  Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1288 (5th Cir. 
1974).  
263Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
264See supra note 260 and accompanying text.  
265See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.  The Court stated: 
[W]e “ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process 
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce 
and open-ended.”  By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty 
interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and 
legislative action.  We must therefore “exercise the utmost care whenever we are 
asked to break new ground in this field,” lest the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court. 
Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which 
radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has 
survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for 
judgment and restraint.”). 
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Justice Cardozo noted that absolute rules of conduct must “flower” from 
experience based upon practices rooted in common experience.  As the same idea is 
described in Glucksberg: “Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus 
provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,’ that direct and 
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.”266  Only when such criteria are 
satisfied can a standard of conduct avoid, in Cardozo’s words, being “artificial” and 
“imposed from without.”267  
A consideration of Cruzan provides a helpful paradigm suggested by Cardozo’s 
reasoning.  Reaching out to common historical practices and applying them to novel 
substantive due process claims raised by the withdrawal of life support, the Court 
was able to articulate a constitutional due process right to refuse such treatment 
based precisely on the historic legal traditions and practices associated with 
traditional doctrines of battery and informed consent.268   
4.  Justice Souter: Due Process as Common Law 
At least in its most general outline, the prudential approach suggested in the 
preceding section comports with Justice Souter’s description of substantive due 
process analysis in Glucksberg.  Addressing the issue of the level of specificity by 
which conduct is to be evaluated in this process,269 Souter rejects the view that 
reasonability could only be defined in terms specified in detail by prior practices.270  
As observed above, Cruzan itself illustrates that the relevance of past practices must 
have some “play” allowing them to be applied to novel circumstances.  Construing 
cases of withdrawal of life support as instances of conduct subject to analysis under 
battery or informed consent does not match up perfectly with prior case law.  
Noting that adjudication under due process demands case by case 
determinations,271 Justice Souter acknowledges that it, “like any other instance of 
judgment[,] depend[s] on common-law method, being more or less persuasive 
according to the usual canons of critical discourse.”272   Souter recognizes that the 
Court’s most basic function in substantive due process cases is not to replace states’ 
determinations with those of the Court, but rather to review those decisions for 
reasonableness: “[J]udicial review still has no warrant to substitute one reasonable 
                                                                
266Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125). 
267See supra note 261. 
268See discussion supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. 
269See discussion supra Part III.A.4 on levels of specificity and analysis of due process 
conduct.  
270See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“My 
understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and subsequent cases 
avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of 
equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific level.”).  
271Id. at 760 (“‘We do not intend to hold that in no such case can the State exercise its 
police power,’ . . . but ‘when and how far such power may be legitimately exercised with 
regard to these subjects must be left for determination to each case as it arises.’” (quoting 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897)).   
272Id. at 769.  
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resolution of the contending positions for another, but authority to supplant the 
balance already struck between the contenders only when it falls outside the realm of 
the reasonable.”273 
In the context of due process analysis and specification of conduct, Justice Souter 
notes that an additional substantive limitation on the common-law method must be 
introduced; namely, the values taken into consideration by a court in making such 
determinations have to be confined “[t]o those truly deserving constitutional stature, 
either to those expressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by ‘the traditions 
from which [the Nation] developed,’ or revealed by contrast with ‘the traditions from 
which it broke.’”274 
In defining the relevant tradition and practices, Justice Souter recognizes that a 
single “strand” of conduct can be woven into the fabric of various historical 
traditions and practices.275 Judges must therefore inevitably make “reasoned 
judgment[s] about which broader principle, as exemplified in the concrete privileges 
and prohibitions embodied in our legal tradition, best fits the particular claim 
asserted in the particular case.”276   
Novel substantive due process issues, then, require an application of prudential 
analogy to prior cases and historical practices in determining the applicable standard 
of review and whether fundamental liberties may be at stake.  And it is precisely in 
terms of avoiding either an absolutist abstract approach or an overly specific 
approach to due process analysis that the common law model of prudential judgment 
reveals itself as appropriate:  
[I]n substantive due process cases . . . , the acceptability of the results is a 
function of the good reasons for the selections made.  It is here that the 
value of common-law method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of 
the common law is suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to 
produce legal petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the 
domains of old principles.  Common-law method tends to pay respect 
instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new 
examples and new counterexamples. . . .  Exact analysis and 
characterization of any due process claim are critical to the method and to 
the result.277 
                                                                
273Id. at 764. 
274Id. at 767 (alteration in original) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
275Id. at 771 n.11 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)  Justice Souter states: 
[T]he task of determining whether the concrete right claimed by an individual in a 
particular case falls within the ambit of a more generalized protected liberty requires 
explicit analysis when what the individual wants to do could arguably be characterized 
as belonging to different strands of our legal tradition requiring different degrees of 
constitutional scrutiny.  
Id.  
276Id.  
277Id. at 770. 
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In keeping with Cardozo’s view that rules of law must “flower” from common 
experience to avoid being artificial or imposed, Souter’s view confirms that the 
“uncovering” of fundamental due process rights—as a “rule of law” conferring 
almost absolute protection upon some form of conduct from state interference278 —
can properly result only from a process of prudential judgment and not simple logical 
deduction.  In making this association between common law and due process 
analysis, Justice Souter cautions that the courts must avoid earlier historical mistakes 
made by adopting an “absolutist” approach to substantive due process,279 and 
remarks: “[T]he business of such review is not the identification of extratextual 
absolutes [nor] a deduction from some first premise.”280  The determination of 
fundamental due process rights requires that the claimed right or prohibition be 
analyzed prudentially in the context of established practices and traditions.281 
Due process analysis then in its very conception excludes derivation of rights 
from mere application of abstract principles.  The further one strays from reference 
to particular traditional practices and the more reliance is put on abstract 
formulations of due process rights to justify a novel claim, the more suspect that it 
becomes.282 
5.  Ordered Liberty as a Free Choice 
The preceding arguments illustrate that reading substantive due process analysis 
through Casey and Lawrence alone easily leads to the conclusion that the Court is 
engaged in an abstract philosophical exercise of creating rights through Platonic 
forms.  On that model, constitutional conclusions follow ineluctably as necessary 
conclusions of analytic logic, available to all persons by virtue of the very rationality 
of the concepts themselves: “‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.’ 
                                                                
278This is not to forget, however, that even these can be restricted for a compelling state 
interest.  See supra note 179. 
279See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761 (“[W]hile the cases in the Lochner line routinely 
invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of 
Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they espoused.”). 
280Id. at 764. 
281The nature of this process of reasoning appears to be accurately captured in the 
following description:   
 All language is the language of a community, be this a community bound by 
biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or technique.  The terms 
used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood in the context of the 
habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and traditions known to the 
users of those terms.  A deviation from usage requires justification . . . . 
CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 513 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1st paperback ed. 1971) 
(1958). 
282As Justice Souter expressly recognized:  “As in any process of rational argumentation, . 
. . when a generally accepted principle is challenged, the broader the attack the less likely it is 
to succeed.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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. . .  Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, 
just as heterosexual persons do.”283 
Consideration of the Aristotelian model of practical reasoning and a more robust 
view of constitutional due process analysis, as articulated most clearly in 
Glucksberg, however, establish that due process analysis carried out on such a model 
is untenable.  Substantive process analysis must ultimately be regarded as a 
prudential effort designed to integrate each citizen’s individual autonomy into a set 
of conditions constituting ordered liberty.  Such an effort necessarily introduces 
limitations upon unfettered human reason’s ability to devise modes of autonomous 
action.   
But if such limitation is inevitable, the concrete meaning of restrained autonomy 
cannot simply be derived from bases meeting the formal criteria of “public reason.”  
In order to be integrated into a particular community at a particular time, it is 
inconceivable—under a proper philosophical account of practical reason or 
substantive due process—that appropriate limitations could be acceptable in 
principle to all rational persons simply as such.  As Aristotle was aware, those sorts 
of determinations presuppose judgments of political good that cannot be reduced to 
matters of pure logic or reason, and that therefore could not in principle be accessible 
to all citizens.284 
In light of the inevitably particularized and varied conceptions of the goods of 
political life—and of the particular good of “ordered liberty”—as incarnated in any 
historical state of affairs, the determination of what constitutes necessary 
constitutional limits upon autonomy and what constitutes ordered liberty will only be 
intelligible in reference to that community’s prior commitments by virtue of its  
practices and historical traditions.  Ordered liberty cannot be conceived of apart from 
such questions:  what specific burdens and rights, what goods and evils are necessary 
for ordered life in that community?  Analogous to Aristotle’s conception of practical 
wisdom depending upon dispositional states, substantive due process questions can 
only be determined, as the Supreme Court recognized in Glucksberg and related 
cases, only by considering the practices and historical traditions as dispositional 
“principles” circumscribing substantive due process analysis.  Such a model, 
however, is fundamentally inconsistent with the liberty analysis some assert can, and 
ought to, be derived from the Casey “autonomy principle” read as a public reason 
ground of rights. 
This line of argument is corroborated by reflection upon the fact that every 
historical experiment aimed at ordered liberty is, in essence, a free choice made by a 
community of human persons; it is, in a real sense, the exercise of autonomy by a 
group of persons.  As many have noted, however, the possibility of autonomous, 
non-deterministic human free choice depends upon the exercise of a specific type of 
reasoning.285  In contrast to the demonstrative syllogistic asserted to be proper to 
public reason as rationally accessible to all, free choices can only result from a 
reasoning process that remains open to the possibility of different conclusions.  It is 
                                                                
283Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
284See supra Part II.A.2, B.1. 
285See generally Edward C. Lyons, All the Freedom You Can Want: The Purported 
Collapse of the Problem of Free Will, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. (forthcoming 2007).  
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precisely this concept of dialectical reasoning that provides an appropriate model of 
all political and practical choices. As one group of scholars has described it:  
Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor 
arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a 
reasonable choice can be exercised.  If freedom was no more than 
necessary adherence to a previously given natural order, it would exclude 
all possibility of choice; and if the exercise of freedom were not based on 
reasons, every choice would be irrational and would be reduced to an 
arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual void.  It is because of the 
possibility of argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling 
reasons, that it is possible to escape the dilemma.286 
If this is correct, any attempt to ground substantive due process rights on 
demonstrative conceptions of public reason model must inevitably fail.  Autonomy 
as a static ideal propagates limitless multiplicities of conduct. Public order, however, 
properly understood as a specific ordering and limitation of possibilities, must in 
some relevant way be specified by principles that are not self-evident and do not 
flow as corollaries from universal ideals.  The possibility of freedom and choice—
including the free choice of a particular state of the world constituting ordered liberty 
and distinguishing it from other possible orders—demands that it be founded upon 
reasons that are not necessarily so.  Accordingly, as in all other matters of 
autonomous choice, the determination of the nature of civic order demands that a 
choice be made by the community based upon reasons that can be reasonably 
disputed.  
Curiously, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence, gives lip-service to 
this traditional common-law bound process of political choice and growing insight 
based on experience: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  
They did not presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us 
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.287 
The Court here implicitly concedes that recognition of expanding components of 
substantive due process liberty can properly arise only as a result of the growing 
insight of the governed over time.  This prophylactic quality of appropriate 
conception of practical political reason is also mirrored in Robert Audi’s comments: 
“Liberalism is designed not to eliminate all disagreements but to nurture conditions 
that keep disagreements from tearing apart the fabric of civil life.”288  Rawls, too, 
makes a similar point when he proposes that the stability of civic life depends upon 
laws based on “public reason.” 
                                                                
286PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 281, at 514. 
287Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
288AUDI & WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 36, at 133. 
74https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss2/5
2007] REASON’S FREEDOM 231 
As a matter of historical fact, however, it seems that Supreme Court has honored 
this paradigm more in the breach than the observance.  In decisions, such as Roe v. 
Wade and its progeny in Casey and Lawrence, the Court treats substantive due 
process liberty as if it were a free-floating concept of philosophical pedigree rather 
than a practical principle incarnated in history and practice.  The still fiercely 
contested reception of these decisions in the public square provides indisputable 
evidence, more than any formal constitutional argument could, that the court has 
failed in its duty to connect its conclusions about liberty with the practices and 
history of the nation.  It has not, in the words of Justice Harlan, based its decisions 
upon, “well-accepted principles and criteria” that allows the decision seamlessly to 
“take ‘its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is 
to come.’”289  Paradoxically, then, it is decisions such as these—those most strongly 
rooted in the Casey ideals of public reason and bare autonomy—that represent the 
greatest threat to the fabric of civic order. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The argument can be made that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Casey and 
Lawrence reflect a capitulation to and adoption of a view of political reasoning 
proposed by influential philosophers such as John Rawls and Robert Audi.  Such 
theorists espouse the view that fundamental substantive due process liberty rights—
in keeping with a concept of political fairness—must be founded upon a notion of 
personal autonomy that may only be restricted under principles that all rational 
persons could in principle accept, that is, by public reason.  Any particular, 
comprehensive views of citizens which cannot be so understood must be rejected as 
an inappropriate basis for limiting personal autonomy.  
This Article proposes that such a view inevitably fails as an adequate 
constitutional theory.  It fundamentally misunderstands the nature of political 
practical reasoning and, for that reason, lacks the ability to articulate any coherent 
practical conception of “ordered liberty.”  The plausibility of this conclusion has 
been supported by a variety of considerations. 
The concept of “public reason” is offered as an epistemological resolution 
professing to mediate civic dilemmas created by incompatible, comprehensive views 
adopted by citizens in a diverse community.  It purports to distill a set of principles 
that provide a shared basis for defending civic liberty and public order that can be 
assented to by all rational citizens in spite of the diversity of their individual 
comprehensive views about the goods of human life.  
Such a position, however, succeeds only by begging the question about the 
meaning and character of the public order and ordered liberty that it purports to 
resolve.  In a pluralistic society, it is inevitable that reasonable but irreconcilable 
views will exist about all fundamental values, including the nature of and conditions 
required for ordered liberty itself.  The conception of ordered liberty, therefore, like 
any other practical matter that falls subject to society’s free choice, intrinsically 
entails the possibility of contradictory rational instantiations and understandings.  
Public reason, however, implausibly assumes that meaningful agreement about 
overlapping conditions that are able to secure public order can be captured by 
                                                                
289Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
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insights that are not subject to such contrariety, but which are rationally acceptable to 
all citizens.  The theory of public reason fails as an adequate descriptive or 
prescriptive constitutional theory because it fails to appreciate the depth of the very 
pluralism which it purportedly resolves.  
Delving more deeply into the nature of public reason’s error (and therefore the 
error of the Court following its siren’s song), its implausibility can be traced 
primarily to the attempt to define as politically permissible only those types of 
arguments and conclusions that proceed in a quasi-demonstrative mode, that is, that 
can make a claim to being acceptable to all rational citizens simply as such.  
Specifically, in the context of substantive due process analysis as read through Casey 
and Lawrence, the employment of the concept of autonomy as a principle of public 
reason, promises (like the Platonic theory of the Good or the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative) to offer a conception of human liberty that all citizens can rationally 
agree upon, and which can successfully function as a basis for identifying and 
preserving basic civic rights and thus social order. 
While it is true that some common notions might be generalized from varied 
choices of civic order, proponents of public reason offer no defense of their 
assumption that such distillations could adequately capture and secure the basic 
conditions necessary for actually bringing about a single determinate view of civic 
order, much less serving as a framework that would comport with all citizens’ 
rational conceptions of public order.  As evidenced in common critiques of Plato and 
Kant, no reason exists to believe that an appropriate account of the determinate 
conditions of public order can be arrived at by employment of such abstract 
conceptualizations. 
Rather, the expectation in a pluralistic society, in opposition to the view espoused 
by public reason, would be that no adequate overlapping consensus regarding the 
nature of civic order could be accessible to all citizens by virtue of rational capacities 
alone.  Instead, the necessarily particularized descriptions of the practices believed to 
constitute (or undermine) civic order depend upon common experience and could 
only be supported by dialectical arguments, that is, arguments that offer less than 
demonstrative rational proof of their validity and which by their nature then remain 
in principle disputable. 
Drawing upon insights gleaned from Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s dialectic and 
well-known critiques of the Kantian project, numerous philosophers recognize that 
human perceptions of “goods,” including the perception of that particular good 
“ordered liberty” itself, cannot be constituted merely through application of universal 
reasoning and logical deduction.  Because “good” means something particular and 
individuated, it follows that ordered liberty, as the fundamental good of a 
community, can never be instantiated, still less protected, through a purely generic 
concept of order that all citizens could in principle accept.  Rather, every conception 
of ordered liberty, as itself the object of a communal, autonomous free choice, must 
be constituted through choices of particular goods reflecting determinate beliefs 
about what specific forms of conduct comport with or destroy that determinate order.  
As both ancient and modern articulations of virtue theory recognize, such free 
choices inevitably depend upon the existence of performatively-conditioned 
cognitive and volitional dispositions, that is, the habits, traditions and practices of a 
community.  
This view is corroborated and confirmed by a better reading of constitutional 
substantive due process analysis offered in Glucksberg.  There the Court articulates 
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clearly that fundamental liberties cannot be derived merely from the bare concept of 
autonomy, but must be based on the nation’s history and tradition and carefully 
described.  As this arguably stronger and more comprehensive tradition of 
constitutional precedent envisions it, the basic freedoms of citizenship can only be 
ascertained by reference to the particular practices and traditions of a community, 
that is, by understanding the particular meanings of “freedom” and “order” as they 
have historically been incarnated.  Only in reference to these practices can the 
meaning of autonomy and “order” take on constitutional significance and practical 
usefulness. 
Obviously hitting upon the level of particularity and abstraction necessary to 
properly define substantive due process rights in the face of novel claims admits of 
no easy, demonstrative resolution.  It must be based on historical practices and 
traditions, and it must employ a model of reasoning comparable, in a meaningful 
way, to that found in the common law, as for example reflected in the analogy of 
prudential negligence analysis.  Ironically, however, the one thing that is or should 
be certain in principle to all rational persons as such, is that a reasonable conception 
of political autonomy and ordered liberty could never be derived from the ethereal 
demands of public reason. 
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